Dec
16
Freedom Agenda: End Days
Filed Under Obama Administration, U.S Foreign Policy, political reform | Leave a Comment
I, for one, will remember the presidency of George W. Bush not only for its follies and misgivings in the international arena, but also for the briefly refreshing period of Arab reform that managed to inspire a healthy chunk of a new generation in the Middle East to believe that representative government and respect for civil rights can be won from their spiteful rulers. While the majority of the new ‘democracy generation’ would not trace their new found demand for political reform back to the outgoing President or the United States in general, the foreign policy of that nation, and specifically, the political pressures put on the tyrants of the Middle East to reform their ways facilitated that region’s protesters and grass roots activists that repeatedly made headlines around the world.
Over the past 8 years, we have seen movements of political reform, as weak as many of them proved to be, arise from soil long barren to the notion of representative governments and respect for freedoms. In Egypt we saw the protests of Kifaya; Lebanon took a courageous step toward true sovereignty; there were movements for the release of journalists, student protests, and bloggers.
The rhetoric of this outgoing administration tied the freedom of the United States to the freedom of the rest of the world, tying the liberation of people to the pursuit of self-interest. From George W. Bush’s second inaugural address (2005):
“The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world.”
The “Freedom Agenda”, as applied to the Middle East through programs such as the Middle East Partnership Initiative, was ultimately abandoned due to rising pressure emanating from an unstable Iraq, requiring a reprioritization of its policies toward the region. While the Iraq war was the most important driver of this change in policy, its failures have influenced three regional developments which have further undermined American policy in the region: Iranian expansionism and its quest for nuclear armament, a failure of Arab states to make progress on political reform, and a perceived hypocrisy on behalf of the United States in its role of democracy promotion.
Thus, it would seem, Obama ‘the pragmatist’ may continue to shy away from the assertive nature of the democracy promotion in the Middle East so characteristic of the Bush administration pre-2006. From Fouad Ajami’s latest piece in the WSJ, “The Return of Realpolitik in Arabia“:
One thing is sure to go with Mr. Bush when he departs to Crawford, Texas: his “diplomacy of freedom.” That diplomacy — which propelled the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which drove the Syrians out of Lebanon after they had all but destroyed the sovereignty of that country, and had challenged pro-American allies in Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula — is gone for good.
It was an odd spectacle, the time behind us: a conservative American president preaching the gospel of liberty for lands beyond, his liberal detractors at home giving voice to a deep skepticism about liberty’s chances in inhospitable settings. No one was more revealing of the liberal temper — and of things to come — than Vice President-elect Joe Biden (then the point man for foreign policy among the Democrats) speaking in December 2006 about the hazards of believing in liberty’s appeal to Muslim lands. Of President Bush, he said: “He has this wholesome but naive view that Westerners’ notions of liberty are easily transported to that area of the world.” Mr. Biden knew better: He warned the president, he said, that Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani’s view of liberty differed from “our view of liberty . . . I think the president thinks there’s a Thomas Jefferson or Madison behind every sand dune waiting to jump up. And there are none.”
Perhaps there aren’t, and perhaps we’ll never get to find out. I can find much to quarrel with in the foreign policy of President Bush and his administration, and the decisions of the last eight years will certainly have played a role in shaping the succeeding decade. I suspect history will not be so kind to the president, and that is largely his own fault. However, should it completely disappear, the assertion with which reform was pursued in the Middle East, for all its faults, is a development I won’t soon forget.
Dec
13
U.S Nuclear Cooperation With U.A.E
Filed Under Egypt, Nuclear Energy, U.A.E, U.S Foreign Policy | 22 Comments
I was going to write something up about this story, in which the WSJ reports that the Bush administration intends to sign a nuclear pact with the U.A.E, the first of its sort with a Middle Eastern nation. Instead, I’ll link to a blog that’s been a helpful resource over the years in helping me to understand the relation between my academic studies and analysis of current events and foreign policy. MDC over at Foreign Policy Watch gives a little insight into similar agreements (’123 agreements‘) that allow U.S companies to engage in nuclear cooperation with foreign states:
Some 123 agreements - ones with India, Russia, and China, for example - are more controversial than others. The US concluded one with Russia under the Bush administration that provoked the ire of several members of Congress even prior to this summer’s war with Georgia. Several members expressed concern that Russia had not been fully cooperative in supporting Washington’s nonproliferation efforts against Tehran, particularly as Moscow is still constructing a light water reactor at Bushehr. In May, the administration sent the agreement to Congress, where it would have had to sit unopposed for 90 days before entering into force. Yet the Russian-Georgian war that broke out in August proved to be the agreement’s spoiler. Sensing that this already hostile legislative environment would have only been further soured by the conflict, the administration pulled the agreement before it could be killed by Congress and also as a way to not be seen as rewarding Russia following its routing of a US ally.
This story is one to watch not only for the significance of a Gulf state pursuing nuclear energy in a manner that contrasts starkly to the road of provocation which Iran has taken, but also for the precedent it would set for other Middle Eastern nations that have expressed interest in acquiring nuclear power over the past few years.
Egypt has already stated its intention to resume work on the building of a nuclear power plant as part of a programme that was halted in the wake of Chernobyl. Back in September of 2006, the nation’s Energy Minister announced plans that would see a power station built on its northern Mediterranean coast, slated for completion within the next decade (I assume that’s Egyptian time). A month later, China announced it had struck a deal with Egypt over nuclear cooperation. Last March, Egypt signed a cooperation deal with Russia, allowing that nation to bid on contracts as well as providing training to Egyptian personnel and supplies of nuclear fuel. Egypt now plans to build 4 power stations in cooperation with international partners and the IAEA.
Egypt is only one of 13 nations in the Middle East to have announced nuclear intentions since 2006, a development brought about by a worsening energy crisis and a will to emulate Iran in an effort to balance regional power.
Dec
12
Iran Rapprochement: Khamenei The Key
Filed Under Iran, Peace Deals, U.S Foreign Policy | Leave a Comment
Sadegh Zibakalam, a professor at Tehran University, penned an op-ed that appeared in Lebanon’s Daily Star in which he questions the difference that a Democratic or Republican U.S president makes on the issue of engaging Iran, also noting that different Iranian presidents have been unable to sway Iranian foreign policy in a more moderate direction with regard to U.S-Iranian relations. The crux of the article is hard to argue, and gives view to the difficulty that Obama will have in making good on his campaign rhetoric of engaging Iran:
Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iranian leaders have watched five presidents of the United States come and go, including Jimmy Carter, who was president during the revolution. Two were Democrats and three were Republicans. Does the presence of a Democrat or a Republican president make any difference to relations between the US and Iran? Judging by these five presidents and three decades of hostility between Tehran and Washington, changes in the White House have made no difference.
The same observation is true of changes in government in Tehran. Hostility toward Washington remained unabated under the pragmatists led by Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the reformists led by Mohammad Khatami and the hard-liners led by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, even though the three governments pursued different policies on many issues.
There was, however, one exception. Khatami pursued a more moderate foreign policy that even included softening Tehran’s hitherto belligerent tone toward the US. The move was not reciprocated by US President Bill Clinton. This was a blow to the reformists in Tehran. The opportunity was ultimately destroyed when the hard-liners seriously opposed the olive branch Khatami extended to the Americans.
History aside, there are serious obstacles to any rapprochement between the two countries. Although at an early stage in his campaign Obama expressed his desire for “direct and unconditional talks” with Ahmadinejad, he was forced to deny this statement and replace it with a declaration of willingness to negotiate directly with Iranian leaders, not necessarily Ahmadinejad. The reason behind Obama’s denial was not difficult to understand. It went back to the root of the dilemma. Ahmadinejad is hugely unpopular in the US. His Holocaust denial, calls for the destruction of Israel, speeches at the United Nations General Assembly, and remarks in interviews and speeches in the US have all made him a remarkably unliked figure among many Americans.
In fairness to Obama, he’s backed off of the more unwitting statements he made during his presidential run when he seemed to suggest that he’d be willing to sit down with Ahmadinijad one-on-one, or at a greater summit. Not that sitting down with other human beings should be avoided; his rhetoric on having the moral courage to talk to those you disagree with was a refreshing divergence from the near-dogmatic morality of the previously established U.S attitudes toward Iran.
Rather, what would sitting down with Ahmadinijad accomplish? Zibakalam rightfully points to the upcoming presidential elections in the Islamic Republic as a sign that a more pragmatic, open president may be elected who could greet Obama’s overtures with more warmth. It would also ease domestic public opinion if Obama engaged an Iranian President that did not make the same vile statements which Ahmadinijad has made in the past. The problem with Zibakalam’s assessment of the situation is that an assumption is made that the Iranian presidency has significant control over the governing attitudes on foreign policy; these anti-U.S, anti-secular attitudes are well enshrined in the country’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. It would seem to me that former President Khatami, an Iranian reformer, failed to impose any significant changes because of the higher authority present in the country. Any policy short of engaging the Iranian regime at its highest, most influential levels would be unlikely to accomplish much. At best, an Obama administration may be able to forge cooperation on issues that are specifically of mutual interest (Iraq, a deal on the nuclear issue if the price is right). Any sea-changes in Iranian attitudes toward the U.S should not be expected until a new Supreme Leader is appointed by the nation’s highest clerical body. Here’s a summary of a study conducted by Carnegie’s Karim Sadjadpour, who argues that an understanding of the role that Khamenei plays in Iranian affairs is vital to any rapprochement (you can download the study at the link):
Sadjadpour argues that “Iran’s Islamic government is more powerful than it has ever been vis-à-vis the United States, Khamenei is more powerful than he’s ever been within Iran, and in order to devise a more effective U.S. policy toward Iran a better understanding of Khamenei is essential.” Though Khamenei is sometimes dismissed as weak and indecisive, Sadjadpour writes, “his rhetoric depicts a resolute leader with a remarkably consistent and coherent—though highly cynical and conspiratorial—world view.”
Given that the real political power of the Iranian Supreme Leader dwarfs that of the president, Sadjadpour argues, “It’s time for the world to focus less on Ahmadinejad and more on Khamenei. His speeches present arguably the most accurate reflection of Iranian domestic and foreign policy aims and actions over the last two decades.” He explores how Khamenei’s unexpected ascent to power is instructive in understanding his style of leadership, and unearths insightful quotes that provide deep insight into Khamenei’s thoughts on issues such as the United States, Israel, Iraq, President Ahmadinejad, and the nuclear issue.
“Given Iran’s centrality to urgent U.S. and European foreign policy challenges—namely Iraq, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, energy security, Arab–Israeli peace, and Afghanistan,” Sadjadpour writes, “the United States does not have the luxury of shunning dialogue with Tehran until Khamenei’s death or the arrival of a more accessible Iranian leader. This could be a long time in coming.”
Sadjadpour argues that any successful approach toward Iran must take into account Khamenei’s pivotal role in Iran’s decision-making process and his deeply held suspicions of the United States. “Trying to engage an Iran with Khamenei at the helm will no doubt be trying, require a great deal of nuance and patience, and offer no guaranteed chance of success. But an approach toward Iran that aims to ignore, bypass, or undermine Khamenei is guaranteed to fail.”
Dec
11
Getting Away With Murder
Filed Under Lebanon, Syria, U.S Foreign Policy, justice | Leave a Comment
The title of the article differs from the one in my post in that it ends with a question mark; I figured I’d go ahead and imply what’s already well assumed. Here’s a blockquote from towards the end of the article when Joshua Hammer sits down with Walid Jumblatt, but be sure to read the entire piece. It’s a captivating narrative of the Hariri Tribunal, and a sobering take on the clash between justice and interest, one that may see the events of February 14th, 2005 figuratively thrown under the bus of the ‘new Middle East’:
“I do believe the U.S. is using the tribunal as a bargaining chip with the Syrian regime,” Jumblatt told me as he gazed out the window toward Syria. Jumblatt had been one of the last people to see Hariri alive; “he believed he was going to be killed,” the chieftain said. Leaning back in a leather chair, hands folded in his lap, Jumblatt looked at once pensive and resigned. The democratic, pro-Western Lebanon he had campaigned for had proved to be a chimera; and the campaign to avenge his closest colleague seemed to be collapsing as well. He said he expected the tribunal to end with some sort of a deal along the lines of that in the Lockerbie case: the regime of the Libyan dictator, Muammar Qaddafi, was accused of blowing up Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in December 1988, killing 270 people. After intense negotiations with Western powers, Qaddafi finally handed over two low-level intelligence agents to face charges in a Scottish court set up in the Netherlands at Camp Zeist, just a few miles from the court in which Hariri’s murder case will be tried. The same kind of arrangement “would be a face-saving solution for Assad,” Jumblatt told me.
Nov
23
Syria Complicit In U.S October Raid
Filed Under Syria, U.S Foreign Policy, raids | 1 Comment
Remember that U.S air strike in Syria toward the end of October that targeted Abu Ghadiyah, the man who conducted the traffic of arms and Qaeda fighters into Iraq?
Remember the ensuing outrage that we were t
reated to every morning in our newspapers?
Well, turns out the Syrians may have been wise to the entire affair, and may have even provided support for the operation. According to Richard Sale of the METimes:
In spite of much angry public protest in Damascus, last month’s killing of top al-Qaida operative Abu Ghadiya, was in fact a joint operation between U.S. Special Forces in Iraq and Syrian intelligence, according to former and serving U.S. intelligence officials.Abu Ghadiya, a smuggler who for years had moved money, weapons and insurgents into Iraq from Syria, was killed by a U.S. helicopter raid on Oct. 26. Seven civilians were killed with him, and the resulting furor was immediate: Russia and the Arab League strongly protested the raid, and Syria accused the United States of “criminal and terrorist aggression” and lodged an official protest, according to U.S. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack. Syria ordered the American School in Damascus closed.
But Syria’s alleged anger was calculated to conceal Syrian complicity in the operation. Although the attack is still officially “classified,” serving and former U.S. intelligence officials told the Middle East Times that Syria gave U.S. forces permission to fly into its airspace and even provided extensive targeting intelligence on Abu Ghadiya. “Syrian intelligence couldn’t have been more cooperative,” said a former senior CIA official.
McCormack recently referred to this new cooperation in veiled language that acknowledged Syria had taken “positive steps” to play a more constructive role in the region even though “there’s still a ways to go.” He did not expand his point.
There’s been speculation of this for a few weeks, but this is the most conclusive article I’ve read on the matter yet. Check out this article from the Guardian at the beginning of this month. Sources also suggest then that Syria had expected the airstrike and that its airforce had authorized the passage of U.S hellicopters into Syrian territory. Perhaps more interesting, the article mentions how an incursive kidnapping operation expected to be bloodless managed to go wrong:
In the time-honoured tradition of covert US operations in the Middle East, this one seems to have gone spectacularly wrong. The Syrians, who had agreed to turn a blind eye to a supposedly quiet “snatch and grab” raid, could not keep the lid on a firefight in which so many people had died.
The operation should have been fast and bloodless. According to the sources, Syrian intelligence tipped off the Americans about Abu Ghadiya’s whereabouts. US electronic intelligence then tracked his exact location, possibly by tracing his satellite telephone, and the helicopters were directed to him. They were supposed to kidnap him and take him to Iraq for questioning.
According to defence sources, when the four US helicopters approached the Syrian border, they were detected by Syrian radar. Air force headquarters in Damascus was asked for permission to intercept.
After an Israeli airstrike against a suspected nuclear reactor in the same region last year, Syrian air defence has been on high alert. The request was turned down by senior officers because the American operation was expected.
It is not clear what went wrong, but it is believed that the helicopters were spotted by the militants on their final approach and a gun battle broke out. That is supported by an account from a local tribal leader, who said a rocket-propelled grenade had been launched from the compound at the helicopter. The firefight blew the cover on a supposedly covert operation.
Ninety minutes after the raid, according to a local tribal leader, agents of the feared Mukhabarat, the Syrian intelligence service, flooded into the village. “They threatened us that if anyone said anything about what happened in this area, their family members would die,” he said.
So the operation’s cover was blown, and the Syrians went into damage control (i.e. denial and victimhood). Either way Syrian complicity in the operation, should we choose to assume that its true, sheds new light onto U.S-Syrian relations (which are improving at the expense of the latter’s political reform) and provides another sign which the future U.S administration will seize upon to make a deal with the Assad regime. While this is not the first example of intelligence sharing between the two countries (intelligence ties were cut off following the assasination of former Lebanese PM Rafik Hariri in 2005), it is a sign that the Syrian leadership wants to remain in control and would be willing to negotiate its alliances should the right offer come its way. Whether or not extending an offer would be the right move is debatable, but this window of opportunity will likely get a few passers-by to stop and peak through over the next four years.
Nov
18
Time To Focus On Egypt
Filed Under Egypt, U.S Foreign Policy, political reform | Leave a Comment
So sounds the message of a recent article in the Arab Reform Bulletin by Mohammed Abdel Baky, who impels the next U.S administration to sieze a moment for change in the process of Middle Eastern political reform. While the 2005 elections proved a watershed moment for the country (the fi
rst election, rather than referendum, of Egypt’s presidency), most analysts looked ahead to 2011as a defining moment in Egypt’s modern political history. Hosni Mubarak will almost certainly give up his post and, at least on paper, his successor will be chosen through a popular vote. While the candidacies will be limited (given the constitutional reforms, indepedent candidates are pratically bareed from running), the direction which Egypt takes politically as well as the nature of the role it plays in Middle Eastern affairs will be dependant on its next leader.
Abdel Baky gives some insight into how the U.S can provide a constructive influence in the next election, building on its experience with the last one:
First, the United States in the near future must be pragmatic in dealing with certain realities that cannot be changed at present, notably candidates for the presidential election that will be held in September 2011. Washington should not attempt to advance one candidate over another or involve itself in any of the scenarios mentioned above. This is the exclusive concern of the Egyptian voter.What the United States should do is to deal with the issue of the future of the Egyptian presidency in two phases: before and after the presidential election. Before the election, the United States should stress the importance of having the next Egyptian president chosen in transparent elections—despite the extremely limited choice of candidates—that the judiciary and civil society are permitted to oversee. After the election, Washington must support Egyptian demands to limit presidential terms to two, which will increase prospects for the peaceful alternation of power and alternative political forces to compete in future elections. Without presidential term limits, democratic reform in Egypt will be exceptionally difficult. Agreeing to such limits would be an important way for the new Egyptian president to demonstrate his seriousness about continuing political reform.The new U.S. president should realize that there is no reason why pressure on Egypt to undertake political reform should damage cooperation between the two countries at the regional level. For example, at the height of the Bush administration’s pressure on Egypt for political reform in 2004-5, Egypt sent an ambassador to Baghdad, the first Arab country to do so after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime. In any case, Egypt’s regional role has declined due primarily to internal political deadlock; a reinvigoration of political life in Egypt might allow it to reclaim its regional role in dealing with issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and reconciliation efforts in Lebanon.As part of a new, more pragmatic approach, the new U.S. administration should finally abandon the fear that democratic reform in Egypt will result in the Muslim Brotherhood coming to power. Constitutional amendments passed in 2007 will prevent this. The Muslim Brotherhood cannot nominate any of its leaders to run for the presidency because it does not have a political party, and a Brotherhood candidate could not obtain enough votes in elected bodies to qualify to run as an independent candidate per stipulations in the Egyptian constitution.Finally, the new U.S. administration should devote special attention to promoting the participation of youth in political parties and civil society. Ever since the United States began its support of democratic reform in Egypt, it has ignored a dangerous demographic reality: according to official statistics, young people make up 40 percent of Egypt’s inhabitants at a time when the country suffers from a severe lack of political participation.
Let’s hope that the opposition candidates, given their resources, will manage to run more effective campaigns with stricter messages, well-defined political platforms, and perhaps more of an emphasis on their vision of the country than their hatred of the current leader. Have a look at Amr Hamzawy’s report on Egypt’s opposition from 2005. We shouldn’t expect any surprises in the next election, but any step taken toward the creation of a serious political culture is a positive one.
Nov
16
Hillary Clinton, Sec. of State, and the Mid East
Filed Under Obama Administration, U.S Foreign Policy | 1 Comment
News reports are buzzing with speculation that Hillary Clinton has been offered the role of Secretary of State in the upcoming Obama administration, a happening I believe few people had expected. If the speculation turns out to be true, however, Clinton may find ample incentive to take the position, given its historical role as a stepping stone to the presidency. Beside the advantage of a padded-resume, the position would allow her to exercise a large measure of influence on U.S foreign policy and perhaps even leave an indelible mark (for better or worse) on its role in global affairs.
Given the narrow margin of her loss to President-elect Obama during the Democratic primaries and the support she still holds among the public and her party’s top brass, her involvement in an Obama administration seemed to be there for the taking if she so desired. Clinton is currently considered the front-runner for the position on a short-list that includes the familiar faces of Senator John Kerry and Former U.N ambassador Bill Richardson. How would the appointment of Hillary Clinton to the Secretary of State affect U.S policy on the Middle East?
Beside running the State Department, the Secretary of State traditionally serves the President as his chief foreign policy advisor. The nature of this role has had exceptions; during the Cold War, depending on the administration, the top foreign policy advisor was sometimes the Secretary of State or the National Security Advisor. In recent times it could be argued that the Vice President’s office has played an enlarged role in the formation of foreign policy. The Secretary of State plays a few other roles in foreign affairs, including the handling of negotiations with foreign governments and their representatives, and the marketing of U.S foreign policy to the rest of the world. Given the presence of Vice President Joe Biden (not my favorite policy architecht, but knowledgable nonetheless), and the possible involvement of Samantha Power in the next administration (an academic and a prominent writer, she’s been widely tapped for the position of National Security Advisor), Clinton’s influence on Obama in matters of foreign affairs may be limited. Further influence on Obama may be hampered by their reportedly contentious relationship stemming from the Democratic primaries. Hillary Clinton’s selling ability however, given her public stature, could be well suited to the position.
Of what we can derive from her presidential run, Clinton’s foreign policy views are nearly identical to those of Obama. Beside the standard campaign rhetoric on Iraq (both want to see a withdrawal of U.S presence, but both are cautious of how this would proceed) and Afghanistan (the first of the individual Wars on Terror is likely to receive a renewed focus in the coming four years), we have little to glean from either of their foreign policy objectives other than an increased emphasis on multilateralism and probably a more realist approach to exercising American power abroad. Compare their Foreign Affairs articles, for instance, written toward the end of 2007. While they generally reek of the traditional ambiguity of a political stump speech, their essays reflect the democratic line on foreign policy, perhaps only separated by their distinct emphasis’ on themes of experience and judgment that served to anchor their campaign messages. The possible points of contention emerge on discussions of approaching Iran, with Clinton seeming rhetorically less-open to high level negotiations with the Islamic Republic that have been proposed by Obama. While their policy differences on Iran are minute, Clinton’s emphasis during the primaries on setting ‘pre-conditions’ before engaging the Iranians (which is already happening) managed to pull Obama’s conciliatory language toward the center on the issue, dropping suggestions that he would meet with Ahmadinejad (a rather pointless endeavor to propose in the first place, given where real power on Iran’s foreign policy is centered).
Clinton does carry some light baggage with respect to Iran. During an interview with ABC news toward the end of her presidential run, she responded to a question about the possibility of Iran attacking Israel with nuclear weapons with this statement:
“I want the Iranians to know that if I’m the president, we will attack Iran. In the next 10 years, during which they might foolishly consider launching an at
tack on Israel, we would be able to totally obliterate them.”
Iran protested formally to the U.N, and Iranian members of parliament responded to the provocation with typical indignation and resentment. While protests to the comment are more symbolic than anything else (similar comments have been made by others throughout the past 8 years), reputation is an integral factor in diplomacy and negotiation, and her efforts to engage Iran may receive a sour reception from an already reluctant political establishment in that country.
Any appointee to the position will be responsible for executing an ambitious agenda challenged by a weakened base of resources and power. The familiar obstacles of Israel-Palestine, MidEast political reform, Iraq, Iran, and Syria-Lebanon require a determined yet pragmatic approach to overcome. With all the talk of Senators and former presidential candidates being considered for the job, one cannot help but wish that more established, wonky foreign affairs experts would be short listed to head the U.S state department. A ceremonial appointee (which Clinton and Kerry would largely be) could serve to draw increased attention to their efforts, but wouldn’t it be more appropriate to appoint a person specialized in foreign affairs or diplomacy to head America’s foreign policy bureaucracy? I’m skeptical of the short-list, but almost any appointee will carry out a similar agenda with regard to the Middle East.