Following the resumption of diplomatic ties between Syria and Lebanon in October, the two states look ready to make good on one of their promises as the names for each country’s ambassadors have been circulating in news reports.  The Foreign Minister’s of each country signed an agreement two months ago in Damascus pledging the establishment of diplomatic ties based on a “mutual respect of each other’s sovereignty and independence.”  The agreement, however, only came in the aftermath of the Lebanese domestic developments in March, which saw Beirut under seige by Hezballah gunmen, eventually earning them veto-power in the national government following an accord brokered by Qatar.  While ties have been resumed, and embassies are scheduled to be opened soon, several contentious issues remain between the two states (including the demarcation of their shared border, which has implications for the Israeli-Syrian negotiations on the Golan Heights).

The two names making the rounds in press reports over the past few days have been the Lebanese Ambassador to Cyprus, Michel El Khoury, and Syria’s Ambassador to Spain, Makram Obeid:

“The cabinet is planning to submit the name of Khoury, the current Lebanese ambassador to Cyprus, to become ambassador in Damascus,” the official told AFP, requesting anonymity.

The cabinet is due to meet on December 15.

In October, Syria and Lebanon established diplomatic ties for the first time since both became independent 60 years ago and vowed to name ambassadors by the end of the year.

Khoury, who will turn 59 on December 24, would not confirm his appointment, telling AFP: “I have not been contacted officially on the matter.”

Once the cabinet officially designates its ambassador, his appointment must then be approved by Damascus before the envoy can take up the post.

Khoury was previously ambassador to The Hague and held top diplomatic jobs in several countries including Britain, Brazil and Mexico.

Diplomatic sources quoted by the Lebanese press say Syria has decided to name its current ambassador to Spain, Makram Obeid, as it envoy to Beirut.

Couldn’t find much more information about the two men, however when/if I do, I’ll be sure to update the post.

Meanwhile, the Syrians are set to sign an agreement with the EU, putting the two actors in a partnership toward establishing stronger economic and cultural ties.  The partnership, which stems from 1995’s Barcelona Process, would also privelage Syria with economic assistance and prefferential trade arrangements.  Syria, which was the lone holdout to the partnership agreement that 11 other regional nations have signed, agreed to terms on the initiative in 2004 only to have the process frozen following the assassination of Lebanese P.M Rafik Hariri in 2005.  The warming of the EU’s perceptions of Syria’s image is another signal that Damascus is being brought back into the international fold after a recent spell of isolation.  What brought about the sudden reversal of attitudes?  David Shenker of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy speculates:

What prompted the EU’s recent reassessment is not entirely clear; the Hariri investigation is months away from conclusion, and the international tribunal will not be operational before spring 2009. To be sure, Europe was impressed this past May by the announcement of Israeli-Syrian (indirect) negotiations in Turkey and by Damascus’s adoption of a seemingly more productive stance vis-a-vis Lebanon, symbolized by the election later that month of Michel Suleiman as president. More recently, Paris expressed delight with Syria’s pledge in July 2008 to open an embassy in Beirut. In the aftermath of these developments, senior-level diplomatic exchanges between Europe and Syria — largely frozen since 2005 — resumed full force.

Despite the fanfare with which these developments were received, Syria’s steps were rather modest. Although Damascus deferred a political crisis in Beirut by allowing the election of a Lebanese chief executive, President Suleiman, who was appointed chief of staff of the Lebanese Armed Forces by Syria in 1998, is widely viewed as sympathetic toward Syria. Likewise, Syrian president Bashar al-Asad’s commitment to open an embassy in Beirut remains only a pledge — and a symbolic gesture at best. Damascus is already hedging on follow-through; in early December, Syrian foreign minister Walid Mouallem said the appointment of an ambassador “would take place gradually.”

Few in Europe are likely to believe that the embassy’s establishment will constitute recognition of Lebanese sovereignty. And many in Lebanon fear a new embassy would represent the reestablishment of Anjar, the notorious former home of Syria’s viceroy in Lebanon.

Continue reading that last link, in which Shenker lists a few ‘inconvenient truths’ that the EU seems to be ignoring.

Also: this news story may spawn a longer post in the future, given that the story develops, but for now a link will suffice.  Iraq has proposed the creation of a regional grouping in the Middle East, modeled after the E.U.

The proposal seems to be the child of a nation eager to reassert itself amongst its neighbors, in which Iraq seems to be ignoring a few inconvenient truths of its own.  My suggestion: forget establishing new partnerships and organizations until the ones that exist function effectively.  Begin a serious process of reforming the Arab League, refocusing its efforts on economic cooperation and policy.  Any new groupings will run into the same ditch of insignificance that its forerunners have been stuck in for years.

The title of the article differs from the one in my post in that it ends with a question mark; I figured I’d go ahead and imply what’s already well assumed.  Here’s a blockquote from towards the end of the article when Joshua Hammer sits down with Walid Jumblatt, but be sure to read the entire piece.  It’s a captivating narrative of the Hariri Tribunal, and a sobering take on the clash between justice and interest, one that may see the events of February 14th, 2005 figuratively thrown under the bus of the ‘new Middle East’:

“I do believe the U.S. is using the tribunal as a bargaining chip with the Syrian regime,” Jumblatt told me as he gazed out the window toward Syria. Jumblatt had been one of the last people to see Hariri alive; “he believed he was going to be killed,” the chieftain said. Leaning back in a leather chair, hands folded in his lap, Jumblatt looked at once pensive and resigned. The democratic, pro-Western Lebanon he had campaigned for had proved to be a chimera; and the campaign to avenge his closest colleague seemed to be collapsing as well. He said he expected the tribunal to end with some sort of a deal along the lines of that in the Lockerbie case: the regime of the Libyan dictator, Muammar Qaddafi, was accused of blowing up Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in December 1988, killing 270 people. After intense negotiations with Western powers, Qaddafi finally handed over two low-level intelligence agents to face charges in a Scottish court set up in the Netherlands at Camp Zeist, just a few miles from the court in which Hariri’s murder case will be tried. The same kind of arrangement “would be a face-saving solution for Assad,” Jumblatt told me.

Remember that U.S air strike in Syria toward the end of October that targeted Abu Ghadiyah, the man who conducted the traffic of arms and Qaeda fighters into Iraq?

Remember the ensuing outrage that we were treated to every morning in our newspapers?

Well, turns out the Syrians may have been wise to the entire affair, and may have even provided support for the operation.  According to Richard Sale of the METimes:

In spite of much angry public protest in Damascus, last month’s killing of top al-Qaida operative Abu Ghadiya, was in fact a joint operation between U.S. Special Forces in Iraq and Syrian intelligence, according to former and serving U.S. intelligence officials.Abu Ghadiya, a smuggler who for years had moved money, weapons and insurgents into Iraq from Syria, was killed by a U.S. helicopter raid on Oct. 26. Seven civilians were killed with him, and the resulting furor was immediate: Russia and the Arab League strongly protested the raid, and Syria accused the United States of “criminal and terrorist aggression” and lodged an official protest, according to U.S. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack. Syria ordered the American School in Damascus closed.

But Syria’s alleged anger was calculated to conceal Syrian complicity in the operation. Although the attack is still officially “classified,” serving and former U.S. intelligence officials told the Middle East Times that Syria gave U.S. forces permission to fly into its airspace and even provided extensive targeting intelligence on Abu Ghadiya. “Syrian intelligence couldn’t have been more cooperative,” said a former senior CIA official.

McCormack recently referred to this new cooperation in veiled language that acknowledged Syria had taken “positive steps” to play a more constructive role in the region even though “there’s still a ways to go.” He did not expand his point.

There’s been speculation of this for a few weeks, but this is the most conclusive article I’ve read on the matter yet.  Check out this article from the Guardian at the beginning of this month.  Sources also suggest then that Syria had expected the airstrike and that its airforce had authorized the passage of U.S hellicopters into Syrian territory.  Perhaps more interesting, the article mentions how an incursive kidnapping operation expected to be bloodless managed to go wrong:

In the time-honoured tradition of covert US operations in the Middle East, this one seems to have gone spectacularly wrong. The Syrians, who had agreed to turn a blind eye to a supposedly quiet “snatch and grab” raid, could not keep the lid on a firefight in which so many people had died.

The operation should have been fast and bloodless. According to the sources, Syrian intelligence tipped off the Americans about Abu Ghadiya’s whereabouts. US electronic intelligence then tracked his exact location, possibly by tracing his satellite telephone, and the helicopters were directed to him. They were supposed to kidnap him and take him to Iraq for questioning.

According to defence sources, when the four US helicopters approached the Syrian border, they were detected by Syrian radar. Air force headquarters in Damascus was asked for permission to intercept.

After an Israeli airstrike against a suspected nuclear reactor in the same region last year, Syrian air defence has been on high alert. The request was turned down by senior officers because the American operation was expected.

It is not clear what went wrong, but it is believed that the helicopters were spotted by the militants on their final approach and a gun battle broke out. That is supported by an account from a local tribal leader, who said a rocket-propelled grenade had been launched from the compound at the helicopter. The firefight blew the cover on a supposedly covert operation.

Ninety minutes after the raid, according to a local tribal leader, agents of the feared Mukhabarat, the Syrian intelligence service, flooded into the village. “They threatened us that if anyone said anything about what happened in this area, their family members would die,” he said.

So the operation’s cover was blown, and the Syrians went into damage control (i.e. denial and victimhood).  Either way Syrian complicity in the operation, should we choose to assume that its true,  sheds new light onto U.S-Syrian relations (which are improving at the expense of the latter’s political reform) and provides another sign which the future U.S administration will seize upon to make a deal with the Assad regime.  While this is not the first example of intelligence sharing between the two countries (intelligence ties were cut off following the assasination of former Lebanese PM Rafik Hariri in 2005), it is a sign that the Syrian leadership wants to remain in control and would be willing to negotiate its alliances should the right offer come its way.  Whether or not extending an offer would be the right move is debatable, but this window of opportunity will likely get a few passers-by to stop and peak through over the next four years.

On a visit to Damascus this week, the first trip made by a top British diplomat since 2001, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband managed to re-establish high level intelligence sharing between his government and the Syrians.  With this renewed measure of cooperation, the Europeans (following Sarkozy’s visit in September) look set to usher Syria back into the international arena and may force the incoming Obama administration to play its hand on Syria early in its tenure.  The diplomatic isolation is beginning to thaw, and Joshua Landis suggests that renewed intelligence sharing will eventually force the United States into the fold, at the very least communicating with the Syrians indirectly:

The announcement that Miliband has re-established high level intelligence sharing with Syria is also significant. Secretary Rice and Foreign Minister Mu`allim discussed restarting intelligence sharing in May 2007 at Sharm al-Sheikh, but Syria asked the US to return an ambassador to Damascus as a sign of Syria’s cooperation. The US refused this gesture, forcing the US military “to take matters in their own hands.” Ultimately, the politicians in Washington forced the Defense department to settle the border issue militarily - hence the raid last month that killed eight Syrians. (We still have no proof that the Americans killed or captured the “facilitator” Abu Ghadiyya, whom they claim they snagged n the raid. I find it a bit odd that they have not shown us a photo of the man as they did with Saddam or his sons. Why all the secrecy about a raid they claimed as a stunning success and a person they have told us so much about?)

At any rate, the Syrians clearly offered the British the same offer they made to the Americans well over a year ago. The difference is that the British have been smart enough to take the offer, sending their foreign minister to Damascus as a gesture of good will and cooperation. So the British will now supply the US with Syrian intelligence. This will be awkward for the Americans; they will be dependent on the British for intelligence. Of course, if the Americans like the bits of intelligence they get from the Syrians, they will have to ask for more and will have to ask the Syrians to act on the intelligence or to deliver certain fighters. In this way, one can only presume that the Americans will start to negotiate with the Syrians indirectly. Just as the Syrians talk to the Israelis through the Turks, the US will talk to the Syrians through the British. The silliness of this will strengthen the Defense Department’s hand in insisting that Washington politicians do the right thing and grow up. It is just plain silly. Syria wants to help the US kill al-Qaida types, but the US refuses to say yes. How goofey is that? If Obama doesn’t send someone of stature to Damascus to fix this, I will eat my hat.

What do these diplomatic overtures signal for Lebanon, a country whose political instability over the past decade can largely be attributed to Syrian interference into Lebanese affairs?  Whenever French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner visits the Levant, he ties the importance of Syrian-Lebanese relations to Syria’s relations with the West.  Miliband is in Lebanon now, and after a meeting with the leader of the Future Movement Saad Hariri had this to say about Lebanese stability:

Miliband said that Lebanon’s stability was an indicator of that in the region.  “We appreciate the important steps that were taken and that are still underway to realize stability and strengthen the state in Lebanon,” he told reporters.  It was crucial, he added, that the international community send a strong message prior to the 2009 parliamentary elections. Miliband noted that his country supported Lebanon by coordinating with the United Nations and giving financing to the International Tribunal and investigation into the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri

The British minister said that the work toward the establishment of Lebanese-Syrian diplomatic ties was important and that he hoped it would be accomplished by the end of 2009. He also said that good neighbors must work together and maintain mutual respect.

His approach over the past three months, Miliband said, toward the peace process in the Middle East included addressing the issue of the Shebaa Farms, on which he said the incoming US administration was also determined to reach a settlement.

Miliband also promised to raise the issue of Syrian support for Hezballah during his trip to Damascus, but the British Foreign Secretary would be wise to remember Damascus’ other transgressions against Lebanese soveriegnty.  As an editorial in NOW Lebanon points out, both the Hariri assisination as well as decades of political interference paint skepticism on the faces of many Lebanese who worry that Syria’s latest maneuver toward the West may come at the expense of its political independence:

Syrian rhetoric on combating extremism may have reassuring resonance in London, but it rings rather hollow in Lebanon, where many Lebanese see Damascus as the arch deliverer of mayhem and murder. The Lebanese can read between the lines and were not surprised when Assad’s warnings of a growing terrorist threat in Tripoli in September were immediately followed by the deployment of thousands of troops along Lebanon’s northern border. Nor were they particularly stunned, when two weeks ago, state-run Syrian television broadcast images of members of Fatah al-Islam, confessing to involvement in the September 28 Damascus car bombing even the 2005 murder of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, all funded apparently the latter’s family.

You see, Mr. Miliband, in Lebanon, where the memories of Syrian occupation are still fresh and often painful, the TV confessions and the saber rattling along its border felt more like a pre-emptive justification for interference in Lebanese security matters or even a limited military intervention to press home the idea that only Damascus can guarantee Lebanon will not become a breeding ground for Sunni extremists.

Mr. Miliband should not forget that the Syrian regime is high on the list of suspects in the Hariri and subsequent assassinations and has been quietly working with its allies in Lebanon to thwart the desire of most Lebanese to see justice run its course. Mr. Miliband’s government supports the UN-sponsored International Tribunal to bring Hariri’s killers to justice, and therefore he must not backtrack and allow Syria to believe that immunity from judicial proceedings can be won with warm diplomacy. It would be fatal for Lebanon’s aspirations of genuine democracy, sovereignty and independence.