Dec

16

Freedom Agenda: End Days

Filed Under Obama Administration, U.S Foreign Policy, political reform | Leave a Comment

I, for one, will remember the presidency of George W. Bush not only for its follies and misgivings in the international arena, but also for the briefly refreshing period of Arab reform that managed to inspire a healthy chunk of a new generation in the Middle East to believe that representative government and respect for civil rights can be won from their spiteful rulers.  While the majority of the new ‘democracy generation’ would not trace their new found demand for political reform back to the outgoing President or the United States in general, the foreign policy of that nation, and specifically, the political pressures put on the tyrants of the Middle East to reform their ways facilitated that region’s protesters and grass roots activists that repeatedly made headlines around the world.

Over the past 8 years, we have seen movements of political reform, as weak as many of them proved to be, arise from soil long barren to the notion of representative governments and respect for freedoms.  In Egypt we saw the protests of Kifaya; Lebanon took a courageous step toward true sovereignty; there were movements for the release of journalists, student protests, and bloggers.

The rhetoric of this outgoing administration tied the freedom of the United States to the freedom of the rest of the world, tying the liberation of people to the pursuit of self-interest. From George W. Bush’s second inaugural address (2005):

“The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world.”

The “Freedom Agenda”, as applied to the Middle East through programs such as the Middle East Partnership Initiative, was ultimately abandoned due to rising pressure emanating from an unstable Iraq, requiring a reprioritization of its policies toward the region. While the Iraq war was the most important driver of this change in policy, its failures have influenced three regional developments which have further undermined American policy in the region: Iranian expansionism and its quest for nuclear armament, a failure of Arab states to make progress on political reform, and a perceived hypocrisy on behalf of the United States in its role of democracy promotion.

Thus, it would seem, Obama ‘the pragmatist’ may continue to shy away from the assertive nature of the democracy promotion in the Middle East so characteristic of the Bush administration pre-2006.  From Fouad Ajami’s latest piece in the WSJ, “The Return of Realpolitik in Arabia“:

One thing is sure to go with Mr. Bush when he departs to Crawford, Texas: his “diplomacy of freedom.” That diplomacy — which propelled the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which drove the Syrians out of Lebanon after they had all but destroyed the sovereignty of that country, and had challenged pro-American allies in Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula — is gone for good.

It was an odd spectacle, the time behind us: a conservative American president preaching the gospel of liberty for lands beyond, his liberal detractors at home giving voice to a deep skepticism about liberty’s chances in inhospitable settings. No one was more revealing of the liberal temper — and of things to come — than Vice President-elect Joe Biden (then the point man for foreign policy among the Democrats) speaking in December 2006 about the hazards of believing in liberty’s appeal to Muslim lands. Of President Bush, he said: “He has this wholesome but naive view that Westerners’ notions of liberty are easily transported to that area of the world.” Mr. Biden knew better: He warned the president, he said, that Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani’s view of liberty differed from “our view of liberty . . . I think the president thinks there’s a Thomas Jefferson or Madison behind every sand dune waiting to jump up. And there are none.”

Perhaps there aren’t, and perhaps we’ll never get to find out. I can find much to quarrel with in the foreign policy of President Bush and his administration, and the decisions of the last eight years will certainly have played a role in shaping the succeeding decade. I suspect history will not be so kind to the president, and that is largely his own fault. However, should it completely disappear, the assertion with which reform was pursued in the Middle East, for all its faults, is a development I won’t soon forget.

Nov

18

Time To Focus On Egypt

Filed Under Egypt, U.S Foreign Policy, political reform | Leave a Comment

So sounds the message of a recent article in the Arab Reform Bulletin by Mohammed Abdel Baky, who impels the next U.S administration to sieze a moment for change in the process of Middle Eastern political reform.  While the 2005 elections proved a watershed moment for the country (the first election, rather than referendum, of Egypt’s presidency), most analysts looked ahead to 2011as a defining moment in Egypt’s modern political history.  Hosni Mubarak will almost certainly give up his post and, at least on paper, his successor will be chosen through a popular vote.  While the candidacies will be limited (given the constitutional reforms, indepedent candidates are pratically bareed from running), the direction which Egypt takes politically as well as the nature of the role it plays in Middle Eastern affairs will be dependant on its next leader.

Abdel Baky gives some insight into how the U.S can provide a constructive influence in the next election, building on its experience with the last one:

First, the United States in the near future must be pragmatic in dealing with certain realities that cannot be changed at present, notably candidates for the presidential election that will be held in September 2011. Washington should not attempt to advance one candidate over another or involve itself in any of the scenarios mentioned above. This is the exclusive concern of the Egyptian voter.
 
What the United States should do is to deal with the issue of the future of the Egyptian presidency in two phases: before and after the presidential election. Before the election, the United States should stress the importance of having the next Egyptian president chosen in transparent elections—despite the extremely limited choice of candidates—that the judiciary and civil society are permitted to oversee. After the election, Washington must support Egyptian demands to limit presidential terms to two, which will increase prospects for the peaceful alternation of power and alternative political forces to compete in future elections. Without presidential term limits, democratic reform in Egypt will be exceptionally difficult. Agreeing to such limits would be an important way for the new Egyptian president to demonstrate his seriousness about continuing political reform.
 
The new U.S. president should realize that there is no reason why pressure on Egypt to undertake political reform should damage cooperation between the two countries at the regional level. For example, at the height of the Bush administration’s pressure on Egypt for political reform in 2004-5, Egypt sent an ambassador to Baghdad, the first Arab country to do so after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime. In any case, Egypt’s regional role has declined due primarily to internal political deadlock; a reinvigoration of political life in Egypt might allow it to reclaim its regional role in dealing with issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and reconciliation efforts in Lebanon.
 
As part of a new, more pragmatic approach, the new U.S. administration should finally abandon the fear that democratic reform in Egypt will result in the Muslim Brotherhood coming to power. Constitutional amendments passed in 2007 will prevent this. The Muslim Brotherhood cannot nominate any of its leaders to run for the presidency because it does not have a political party, and a Brotherhood candidate could not obtain enough votes in elected bodies to qualify to run as an independent candidate per stipulations in the Egyptian constitution.
 
Finally, the new U.S. administration should devote special attention to promoting the participation of youth in political parties and civil society. Ever since the United States began its support of democratic reform in Egypt, it has ignored a dangerous demographic reality: according to official statistics, young people make up 40 percent of Egypt’s inhabitants at a time when the country suffers from a severe lack of political participation.
Outside observers should remain wary of the extent toward which this election will reinvigorate Egypt’s role in the region.  The ultimate goal in the next election, for activists and policy makers both within and outside the country, should be to push Egypt back on a path that stimulates its political culture.  Voter turnout must increase, as must the integrity of the elections.  Another 10% turnout will render the election meaningless to true democratic reform.  This is certainly a daunting task, but any progress must begin with an initiative of political education, and it must begin this year.

Let’s hope that the opposition candidates, given their resources, will manage to run more effective campaigns with stricter messages, well-defined political platforms, and perhaps more of an emphasis on their vision of the country than their hatred of the current leader.  Have a look at Amr Hamzawy’s report on Egypt’s opposition from 2005.  We shouldn’t expect any surprises in the next election, but any step taken toward the creation of a serious political culture is a positive one.