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Sadegh Zibakalam, a professor at Tehran University, penned an op-ed that appeared in Lebanon’s Daily Star in which he questions the difference that a Democratic or Republican U.S president makes on the issue of engaging Iran, also noting that different Iranian presidents have been unable to sway Iranian foreign policy in a more moderate direction with regard to U.S-Iranian relations.  The crux of the article is hard to argue, and gives view to the difficulty that Obama will have in making good on his campaign rhetoric of engaging Iran:

Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iranian leaders have watched five presidents of the United States come and go, including Jimmy Carter, who was president during the revolution. Two were Democrats and three were Republicans. Does the presence of a Democrat or a Republican president make any difference to relations between the US and Iran? Judging by these five presidents and three decades of hostility between Tehran and Washington, changes in the White House have made no difference.

The same observation is true of changes in government in Tehran. Hostility toward Washington remained unabated under the pragmatists led by Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the reformists led by Mohammad Khatami and the hard-liners led by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, even though the three governments pursued different policies on many issues.

There was, however, one exception. Khatami pursued a more moderate foreign policy that even included softening Tehran’s hitherto belligerent tone toward the US. The move was not reciprocated by US President Bill Clinton. This was a blow to the reformists in Tehran. The opportunity was ultimately destroyed when the hard-liners seriously opposed the olive branch Khatami extended to the Americans.

History aside, there are serious obstacles to any rapprochement between the two countries. Although at an early stage in his campaign Obama expressed his desire for “direct and unconditional talks” with Ahmadinejad, he was forced to deny this statement and replace it with a declaration of willingness to negotiate directly with Iranian leaders, not necessarily Ahmadinejad. The reason behind Obama’s denial was not difficult to understand. It went back to the root of the dilemma. Ahmadinejad is hugely unpopular in the US. His Holocaust denial, calls for the destruction of Israel, speeches at the United Nations General Assembly, and remarks in interviews and speeches in the US have all made him a remarkably unliked figure among many Americans.  

In fairness to Obama, he’s backed off of the more unwitting statements he made during his presidential run when he seemed to suggest that he’d be willing to sit down with Ahmadinijad one-on-one, or at a greater summit.  Not that sitting down with other human beings should be avoided; his rhetoric on having the moral courage to talk to those you disagree with was a refreshing divergence from the near-dogmatic morality of the previously established U.S attitudes toward Iran. 

Rather, what would sitting down with Ahmadinijad accomplish?  Zibakalam rightfully points to the upcoming presidential elections in the Islamic Republic as a sign that a more pragmatic, open president may be elected who could greet Obama’s overtures with more warmth.  It would also ease domestic public opinion if Obama engaged an Iranian President that did not make the same vile statements which Ahmadinijad has made in the past.  The problem with Zibakalam’s assessment of the situation is that an assumption is made that the Iranian presidency has significant control over the governing attitudes on foreign policy; these anti-U.S, anti-secular attitudes are well enshrined in the country’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.  It would seem to me that former President Khatami, an Iranian reformer, failed to impose any significant changes because of the higher authority present in the country.  Any policy short of engaging the Iranian regime at its highest, most influential levels would be unlikely to accomplish much.  At best, an Obama administration may be able to forge cooperation on issues that are specifically of mutual interest (Iraq, a deal on the nuclear issue if the price is right).  Any sea-changes in Iranian attitudes toward the U.S should not be expected until a new Supreme Leader is appointed by the nation’s highest clerical body.  Here’s a summary of a study conducted by Carnegie’s Karim Sadjadpour, who argues that an understanding of the role that Khamenei plays in Iranian affairs is vital to any rapprochement (you can download the study at the link):

Sadjadpour argues that “Iran’s Islamic government is more powerful than it has ever been vis-à-vis the United States, Khamenei is more powerful than he’s ever been within Iran, and in order to devise a more effective U.S. policy toward Iran a better understanding of Khamenei is essential.” Though Khamenei is sometimes dismissed as weak and indecisive, Sadjadpour writes, “his rhetoric depicts a resolute leader with a remarkably consistent and coherent—though highly cynical and conspiratorial—world view.”

Given that the real political power of the Iranian Supreme Leader dwarfs that of the president, Sadjadpour argues, “It’s time for the world to focus less on Ahmadinejad and more on Khamenei. His speeches present arguably the most accurate reflection of Iranian domestic and foreign policy aims and actions over the last two decades.” He explores how Khamenei’s unexpected ascent to power is instructive in understanding his style of leadership, and unearths insightful quotes that provide deep insight into Khamenei’s thoughts on issues such as the United States, Israel, Iraq, President Ahmadinejad, and the nuclear issue.

“Given Iran’s centrality to urgent U.S. and European foreign policy challenges—namely Iraq, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, energy security, Arab–Israeli peace, and Afghanistan,” Sadjadpour writes, “the United States does not have the luxury of shunning dialogue with Tehran until Khamenei’s death or the arrival of a more accessible Iranian leader. This could be a long time in coming.”

Sadjadpour argues that any successful approach toward Iran must take into account Khamenei’s pivotal role in Iran’s decision-making process and his deeply held suspicions of the United States. “Trying to engage an Iran with Khamenei at the helm will no doubt be trying, require a great deal of nuance and patience, and offer no guaranteed chance of success. But an approach toward Iran that aims to ignore, bypass, or undermine Khamenei is guaranteed to fail.”

Mahmoud Abbas issued what some have been calling the ‘threat’ of elections in the coming year should Palestine’s two major political factions, Hamas and Fatah, fail to reconcile anytime soon:

“We are determined that there be a continuation of the dialogue and will make every effort for it to succeed but if not, there will be a presidential decree at the onset of next year for simultaneous presidential and legislative elections,” Mr Abbas, pictured below, told a meeting of Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) committee members.

He did not set a date for a possible poll but said that any decree would call for elections to be held according to a system of “total proportional representation”, which would do away with the district contests that contributed to Hamas’s shock victory in the 2006 legislative elections. Hamas rejected Mr Abbas’s proposal, a stance which in effect makes it impossible for balloting to be held in Gaza.

Hani al-Masri, the director of the Alternatives think-tank in Ramallah, said that a new poll could make the Fatah-Hamas rivalry more bitter.

“If elections are held without Hamas’s agreement, we could end up with Fatah holding its own elections in the West Bank and Hamas holding its own elections in Gaza. Then the Palestinian division will reach the point of no return.” The ensuing legitimacy crisis could deteriorate to the point of “assassinations and bombings”, he said.

There are also doubts about whether Israel, which controls movement in the West Bank, would agree to polling.

That last point is significant as well, considering a recent report issued by the Isreali defense establishment to the country’s cabinet advising the prevention of “elections in the PA, even at the cost of a confrontation with the US and the international community”.

Just how wise would it be to hold elections in the Palestinian territories?  The two factions hold effective strongholds in their respective territories, and any new poll would likely strengthen the divide between Gaza and the West Bank.  Abbas is claiming he’d call for elections if no reconciliation is reached; with the governing institutions divided between the two territories, reconciliation seemed to many to be a prerequisite for elections.  Add to that Abbas’ inability to stimulate a grass-roots movement among the youth of the West Bank and the subsequent lack of new leaders to reinvigorate Palestinian politics, and a new election process may not necessarily favor Fatah.

I imagine the incoming U.S administration has learned from its experience with the previous Palestinian elections, and likely seek to temper talks of voting and stress the process of reconciliation before new leadership is selected.  The unfortunate reality remains that the ‘threat’ of elections seems empty given the consequences such a procedure would entail and the interests of third parties involved in the conflict.

In related Palestine/Israel news, the Saudi-sponsored 2002 Arab Peace Initiative is being pushed by British Foreign Secretary David Miliband, and by Abbas who took a more direct route of communicating with Israelis through a full page ad published in Israeli papers.  Hamas has denounced the move, calling Abbas a “merchant” for selling Palestinians’ rights.

Saudi Arabia’s King Abdallah is set to lead a religious conference hosted by the U.N today, with the monarch providing the opening address to the event.  While much of the commentary on this story has centered on the dialectical tension between the Saudis and religious tolerance, when viewed within the framework of the Kingdom’s foreign policy initiatives of late it reflects a sustained effort to improve Saudi Arabia’s image internationally, meanwhile solidifying its role as a key player in Middle Eastern affairs.  The King’s visit to the Vatican, the religious summits hosted by the Kingdom which culminated in the Madrid declaration signed in July, and the increased chatter about opening the country’s first Catholic church all serve to obscure the Saudi reality of religious tolerance.

The transgressions on religious freedom in Saudi Arabia are well documented and form a list that would be too tedious to repeat in this space.  The Kingdom’s international role, however, has reached new levels of stature; it has been courted by Western leaders (most notably during a recent visit by British PM Gordon Brown) to play a significant role in the handling of the latest financial crisis (no pledges of Saudi support at the last G-20 summit, but the significance of the enhanced status in the crisis speaks for itself).  The Saudis have also stepped up their roles in regional conflict resolution, exercising clout in the conflicts of Lebanon and Israel-Palestine (Obama will apparently base his MidEast peace efforts on the ‘Abdallah plan’, a road map to peace drafted in 2002.  A careful look at the language of the plan reveals how likely it is to work, but will still serve the Saudi’s well by creating constructive image of the country). (Update: Obama does not support the plan, according to peace-envoy Dennis Ross.)

All of this is to say that Saudi Arabia will likely be called on by the next U.S administration for help in cobbling together some sort of MidEast peace initiative, in large part due to a conscious effort since 2001 to improve the Kingdom’s international image.  How successful will the Saudis be?  If successful peace-talk mediation is going to come from anywhere in the Gulf, it may well be a country with a better recent track-record of MidEast solutions and less conflicting interests.

On a visit to Damascus this week, the first trip made by a top British diplomat since 2001, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband managed to re-establish high level intelligence sharing between his government and the Syrians.  With this renewed measure of cooperation, the Europeans (following Sarkozy’s visit in September) look set to usher Syria back into the international arena and may force the incoming Obama administration to play its hand on Syria early in its tenure.  The diplomatic isolation is beginning to thaw, and Joshua Landis suggests that renewed intelligence sharing will eventually force the United States into the fold, at the very least communicating with the Syrians indirectly:

The announcement that Miliband has re-established high level intelligence sharing with Syria is also significant. Secretary Rice and Foreign Minister Mu`allim discussed restarting intelligence sharing in May 2007 at Sharm al-Sheikh, but Syria asked the US to return an ambassador to Damascus as a sign of Syria’s cooperation. The US refused this gesture, forcing the US military “to take matters in their own hands.” Ultimately, the politicians in Washington forced the Defense department to settle the border issue militarily - hence the raid last month that killed eight Syrians. (We still have no proof that the Americans killed or captured the “facilitator” Abu Ghadiyya, whom they claim they snagged n the raid. I find it a bit odd that they have not shown us a photo of the man as they did with Saddam or his sons. Why all the secrecy about a raid they claimed as a stunning success and a person they have told us so much about?)

At any rate, the Syrians clearly offered the British the same offer they made to the Americans well over a year ago. The difference is that the British have been smart enough to take the offer, sending their foreign minister to Damascus as a gesture of good will and cooperation. So the British will now supply the US with Syrian intelligence. This will be awkward for the Americans; they will be dependent on the British for intelligence. Of course, if the Americans like the bits of intelligence they get from the Syrians, they will have to ask for more and will have to ask the Syrians to act on the intelligence or to deliver certain fighters. In this way, one can only presume that the Americans will start to negotiate with the Syrians indirectly. Just as the Syrians talk to the Israelis through the Turks, the US will talk to the Syrians through the British. The silliness of this will strengthen the Defense Department’s hand in insisting that Washington politicians do the right thing and grow up. It is just plain silly. Syria wants to help the US kill al-Qaida types, but the US refuses to say yes. How goofey is that? If Obama doesn’t send someone of stature to Damascus to fix this, I will eat my hat.

What do these diplomatic overtures signal for Lebanon, a country whose political instability over the past decade can largely be attributed to Syrian interference into Lebanese affairs?  Whenever French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner visits the Levant, he ties the importance of Syrian-Lebanese relations to Syria’s relations with the West.  Miliband is in Lebanon now, and after a meeting with the leader of the Future Movement Saad Hariri had this to say about Lebanese stability:

Miliband said that Lebanon’s stability was an indicator of that in the region.  “We appreciate the important steps that were taken and that are still underway to realize stability and strengthen the state in Lebanon,” he told reporters.  It was crucial, he added, that the international community send a strong message prior to the 2009 parliamentary elections. Miliband noted that his country supported Lebanon by coordinating with the United Nations and giving financing to the International Tribunal and investigation into the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri

The British minister said that the work toward the establishment of Lebanese-Syrian diplomatic ties was important and that he hoped it would be accomplished by the end of 2009. He also said that good neighbors must work together and maintain mutual respect.

His approach over the past three months, Miliband said, toward the peace process in the Middle East included addressing the issue of the Shebaa Farms, on which he said the incoming US administration was also determined to reach a settlement.

Miliband also promised to raise the issue of Syrian support for Hezballah during his trip to Damascus, but the British Foreign Secretary would be wise to remember Damascus’ other transgressions against Lebanese soveriegnty.  As an editorial in NOW Lebanon points out, both the Hariri assisination as well as decades of political interference paint skepticism on the faces of many Lebanese who worry that Syria’s latest maneuver toward the West may come at the expense of its political independence: