Dec
16
Freedom Agenda: End Days
Filed Under Obama Administration, U.S Foreign Policy, political reform | Leave a Comment
I, for one, will remember the presidency of George W. Bush not only for its follies and misgivings in the international arena, but also for the briefly refreshing period of Arab reform that managed to inspire a healthy chunk of a new generation in the Middle East to believe that representative government and respect for civil rights can be won from their spiteful rulers. While the majority of the new ‘democracy generation’ would not trace their new found demand for political reform back to the outgoing President or the United States in general, the foreign policy of that nation, and specifically, the political pressures put on the tyrants of the Middle East to reform their ways facilitated that region’s protesters and grass roots activists that repeatedly made headlines around the world.
Over the past 8 years, we have seen movements of political reform, as weak as many of them proved to be, arise from soil long barren to the notion of representative governments and respect for freedoms. In Egypt we saw the protests of Kifaya; Lebanon took a courageous step toward true sovereignty; there were movements for the release of journalists, student protests, and bloggers.
The rhetoric of this outgoing administration tied the freedom of the United States to the freedom of the rest of the world, tying the liberation of people to the pursuit of self-interest. From George W. Bush’s second inaugural address (2005):
“The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world.”
The “Freedom Agenda”, as applied to the Middle East through programs such as the Middle East Partnership Initiative, was ultimately abandoned due to rising pressure emanating from an unstable Iraq, requiring a reprioritization of its policies toward the region. While the Iraq war was the most important driver of this change in policy, its failures have influenced three regional developments which have further undermined American policy in the region: Iranian expansionism and its quest for nuclear armament, a failure of Arab states to make progress on political reform, and a perceived hypocrisy on behalf of the United States in its role of democracy promotion.
Thus, it would seem, Obama ‘the pragmatist’ may continue to shy away from the assertive nature of the democracy promotion in the Middle East so characteristic of the Bush administration pre-2006. From Fouad Ajami’s latest piece in the WSJ, “The Return of Realpolitik in Arabia“:
One thing is sure to go with Mr. Bush when he departs to Crawford, Texas: his “diplomacy of freedom.” That diplomacy — which propelled the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which drove the Syrians out of Lebanon after they had all but destroyed the sovereignty of that country, and had challenged pro-American allies in Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula — is gone for good.
It was an odd spectacle, the time behind us: a conservative American president preaching the gospel of liberty for lands beyond, his liberal detractors at home giving voice to a deep skepticism about liberty’s chances in inhospitable settings. No one was more revealing of the liberal temper — and of things to come — than Vice President-elect Joe Biden (then the point man for foreign policy among the Democrats) speaking in December 2006 about the hazards of believing in liberty’s appeal to Muslim lands. Of President Bush, he said: “He has this wholesome but naive view that Westerners’ notions of liberty are easily transported to that area of the world.” Mr. Biden knew better: He warned the president, he said, that Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani’s view of liberty differed from “our view of liberty . . . I think the president thinks there’s a Thomas Jefferson or Madison behind every sand dune waiting to jump up. And there are none.”
Perhaps there aren’t, and perhaps we’ll never get to find out. I can find much to quarrel with in the foreign policy of President Bush and his administration, and the decisions of the last eight years will certainly have played a role in shaping the succeeding decade. I suspect history will not be so kind to the president, and that is largely his own fault. However, should it completely disappear, the assertion with which reform was pursued in the Middle East, for all its faults, is a development I won’t soon forget.
Nov
16
Hillary Clinton, Sec. of State, and the Mid East
Filed Under Obama Administration, U.S Foreign Policy | 1 Comment
News reports are buzzing with speculation that Hillary Clinton has been offered the role of Secretary of State in the upcoming Obama administration, a happening I believe few people had expected. If the speculation turns out to be true, however, Clinton may find ample incentive to take the position, given its historical role as a stepping stone to the presidency. Beside the advantage of a padded-resume, the position would allow her to exercise a large measure of influence on U.S foreign policy and perhaps even leave an indelible mark (for better or worse) on its role in global affairs.
Given the narrow margin of her loss to President-elect Obama during the Democratic primaries and the support she still holds among the public and her party’s top brass, her involvement in an Obama administration seemed to be there for the taking if she so desired. Clinton is currently considered the front-runner for the position on a short-list that includes the familiar faces of Senator John Kerry and Former U.N ambassador Bill Richardson. How would the appointment of Hillary Clinton to the Secretary of State affect U.S policy on the Middle East?
Beside running the State Department, the Secretary of State traditionally serves the President as his chief foreign policy advisor. The nature of this role has had exceptions; during the Cold War, depending on the administration, the top foreign policy advisor was sometimes the Secretary of State or the National Security Advisor. In recent times it could be argued that the Vice President’s office has played an enlarged role in the formation of foreign policy. The Secretary of State plays a few other roles in foreign affairs, including the handling of negotiations with foreign governments and their representatives, and the marketing of U.S foreign policy to the rest of the world. Given the presence of Vice President Joe Biden (not my favorite policy architecht, but knowledgable nonetheless), and the possible involvement of Samantha Power in the next administration (an academic and a prominent writer, she’s been widely tapped for the position of National Security Advisor), Clinton’s influence on Obama in matters of foreign affairs may be limited. Further influence on Obama may be hampered by their reportedly contentious relationship stemming from the Democratic primaries. Hillary Clinton’s selling ability however, given her public stature, could be well suited to the position.
Of what we can derive from her presidential run, Clinton’s foreign policy views are nearly identical to those of Obama. Beside the standard campaign rhetoric on Iraq (both want to see a withdrawal of U.S presence, but both are cautious of how this would proceed) and Afghanistan (the first of the individual Wars on Terror is likely to receive a renewed focus in the coming four years), we have little to glean from either of their foreign policy objectives other than an increased emphasis on multilateralism and probably a more realist approach to exercising American power abroad. Compare their Foreign Affairs articles, for instance, written toward the end of 2007. While they generally reek of the traditional ambiguity of a political stump speech, their essays reflect the democratic line on foreign policy, perhaps only separated by their distinct emphasis’ on themes of experience and judgment that served to anchor their campaign messages. The possible points of contention emerge on discussions of approaching Iran, with Clinton seeming rhetorically less-open to high level negotiations with the Islamic Republic that have been proposed by Obama. While their policy differences on Iran are minute, Clinton’s emphasis during the primaries on setting ‘pre-conditions’ before engaging the Iranians (which is already happening) managed to pull Obama’s conciliatory language toward the center on the issue, dropping suggestions that he would meet with Ahmadinejad (a rather pointless endeavor to propose in the first place, given where real power on Iran’s foreign policy is centered).
Clinton does carry some light baggage with respect to Iran. During an interview with ABC news toward the end of her presidential run, she responded to a question about the possibility of Iran attacking Israel with nuclear weapons with this statement:
“I want the Iranians to know that if I’m the president, we will attack Iran. In the next 10 years, during which they might foolishly consider launching an at
tack on Israel, we would be able to totally obliterate them.”
Iran protested formally to the U.N, and Iranian members of parliament responded to the provocation with typical indignation and resentment. While protests to the comment are more symbolic than anything else (similar comments have been made by others throughout the past 8 years), reputation is an integral factor in diplomacy and negotiation, and her efforts to engage Iran may receive a sour reception from an already reluctant political establishment in that country.
Any appointee to the position will be responsible for executing an ambitious agenda challenged by a weakened base of resources and power. The familiar obstacles of Israel-Palestine, MidEast political reform, Iraq, Iran, and Syria-Lebanon require a determined yet pragmatic approach to overcome. With all the talk of Senators and former presidential candidates being considered for the job, one cannot help but wish that more established, wonky foreign affairs experts would be short listed to head the U.S state department. A ceremonial appointee (which Clinton and Kerry would largely be) could serve to draw increased attention to their efforts, but wouldn’t it be more appropriate to appoint a person specialized in foreign affairs or diplomacy to head America’s foreign policy bureaucracy? I’m skeptical of the short-list, but almost any appointee will carry out a similar agenda with regard to the Middle East.