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Back when the global food crisis, which is certainly ongoing, was making the front pages of international newspapers, a particular spotlight was shone on Egypt.  Not only were there several stories of the bread shortage, to which the government responded by commissioning the military to open more bakeries to avoid both hunger and the inevitable political unrest; the rise of food prices also spawned two days of rioting in the industrial city of Mahalla, home to the region’s largest textile factory.  From the L.A Times blog, Babylon and Beyond, April 9th:

The two-day riots this week that rocked the Delta province town of Mahalla, leaving one young man dead and about a hundred injured, exposed the failures of President Hosni Mubarak’s regime. The clashes erupted after the police aborted a planned strike by the town’s 25,000 textile workers. Police fired tear gas and rioters threw stones and burned schools and shops.

The workers were angry over low wages and triple-digit inflation that have led to increasing unrest in a country where nearly half the population is poor. The Egyptian economy is growing, but the benefits have not trickled to the middle and lower classes, who blame Mubarak for years of neglect.

“The whole world suffers from inflation. Each state deals with the problem according to its capabilities; however, the Egyptian government failed in dealing with the crisis and let it deteriorate,” wrote columnist Khairy Ramadan in the independent al-masry al-Youm daily. “Aimless anger and aimless siege will only lead to chaos.”

Yesterday, an emergency court sentenced 22 of the rioters to jail-terms ranging from 3 and 5 years:

Among the 22 people convicted was a 58-year-old woman who was sentenced to three years in jail for allegedly carrying a Molotov cocktail.

Only Mubarak can intervene with a presidential pardon in the cases of those convicted, as under the 27-year Emergency Law emergency courts have no appeal process and the verdicts will stand.

Mubarak has kept the country under a state of emergency since President Anwar Sadat was assassinated in 1981 in order to combat terrorism. The powers enacted under the emergency law give the government the right to imprison anyone for any length of time for virtually no reason at all, and it widely and freely uses that prerogative.

“Those sentenced today are scapegoats used by the authorities to hide their inability to adequately handle the Mahalla protests and to cover up for their failure to investigate the killing of three people, including a 15-year-old boy,” said Hassiba Hadj Sahraoui, Amnesty International’s Middle East and North Africa deputy program director in a statement.

At least 20 percent of Egypt’s 80 million people live on less than $2 per day. With the sharply rising cost of living facing the North African nation, the majority of Egyptians are finding it difficult to support their families.

This is a sad reminder of how the Middle East’s authoritarian governments deal with demands for an increased quality of life; they feed oppression with more oppression.

Here’s some insight into the riots of April and their significance.  An interview with Saad Eddin Ibrahim AlJazeera English’s program “Frost over the World”, on April 16th:

I was going to write something up about this story, in which the WSJ reports that the Bush administration intends to sign a nuclear pact with the U.A.E, the first of its sort with a Middle Eastern nation.  Instead, I’ll link to a blog that’s been a helpful resource over the years in helping me to understand the relation between my academic studies and analysis of current events and foreign policy.  MDC over at Foreign Policy Watch gives a little insight into similar agreements (’123 agreements‘) that allow U.S companies to engage in nuclear cooperation with foreign states:

Some 123 agreements - ones with India, Russia, and China, for example - are more controversial than others. The US concluded one with Russia under the Bush administration that provoked the ire of several members of Congress even prior to this summer’s war with Georgia. Several members expressed concern that Russia had not been fully cooperative in supporting Washington’s nonproliferation efforts against Tehran, particularly as Moscow is still constructing a light water reactor at Bushehr. In May, the administration sent the agreement to Congress, where it would have had to sit unopposed for 90 days before entering into force. Yet the Russian-Georgian war that broke out in August proved to be the agreement’s spoiler. Sensing that this already hostile legislative environment would have only been further soured by the conflict, the administration pulled the agreement before it could be killed by Congress and also as a way to not be seen as rewarding Russia following its routing of a US ally.

This story is one to watch not only for the significance of a Gulf state pursuing nuclear energy in a manner that contrasts starkly to the road of provocation which Iran has taken, but also for the precedent it would set for other Middle Eastern nations that have expressed interest in acquiring nuclear power over the past few years.

Egypt has already stated its intention to resume work on the building of a nuclear power plant as part of a programme that was halted in the wake of Chernobyl.  Back in September of 2006, the nation’s Energy Minister announced plans that would see a power station built on its northern Mediterranean coast, slated for completion within the next decade (I assume that’s Egyptian time).  A month later, China announced it had struck a deal with Egypt over nuclear cooperation.  Last March, Egypt signed a cooperation deal with Russia, allowing that nation to bid on contracts as well as providing training to Egyptian personnel and supplies of nuclear fuel.  Egypt now plans to build 4 power stations in cooperation with international partners and the IAEA.

Egypt is only one of 13 nations in the Middle East to have announced nuclear intentions since 2006, a development brought about by a worsening energy crisis and a will to emulate Iran in an effort to balance regional power.

According to a statement by Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmad Aboul Gheit, Hezballah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah has been invited to visit Egypt “if he wants or can.” This comes after last months speculation in Lebanese and Israeli media, and subsequent denial by sources in the Egyptian government of any such overtures being extended toward Nasrallah.

I imagine that increased engagement by Middle Eastern players with Hezballah is an inevitability, however how would the reception of high-level Hezballah officials be seen by Egypt’s Western allies?  And what role, besides the limited one it has already played in supporting Lebanon’s military and government, does Egypt envisage itself carrying out with regard to Hezballah?

So sounds the message of a recent article in the Arab Reform Bulletin by Mohammed Abdel Baky, who impels the next U.S administration to sieze a moment for change in the process of Middle Eastern political reform.  While the 2005 elections proved a watershed moment for the country (the first election, rather than referendum, of Egypt’s presidency), most analysts looked ahead to 2011as a defining moment in Egypt’s modern political history.  Hosni Mubarak will almost certainly give up his post and, at least on paper, his successor will be chosen through a popular vote.  While the candidacies will be limited (given the constitutional reforms, indepedent candidates are pratically bareed from running), the direction which Egypt takes politically as well as the nature of the role it plays in Middle Eastern affairs will be dependant on its next leader.

Abdel Baky gives some insight into how the U.S can provide a constructive influence in the next election, building on its experience with the last one:

First, the United States in the near future must be pragmatic in dealing with certain realities that cannot be changed at present, notably candidates for the presidential election that will be held in September 2011. Washington should not attempt to advance one candidate over another or involve itself in any of the scenarios mentioned above. This is the exclusive concern of the Egyptian voter.

 

What the United States should do is to deal with the issue of the future of the Egyptian presidency in two phases: before and after the presidential election. Before the election, the United States should stress the importance of having the next Egyptian president chosen in transparent elections—despite the extremely limited choice of candidates—that the judiciary and civil society are permitted to oversee. After the election, Washington must support Egyptian demands to limit presidential terms to two, which will increase prospects for the peaceful alternation of power and alternative political forces to compete in future elections. Without presidential term limits, democratic reform in Egypt will be exceptionally difficult. Agreeing to such limits would be an important way for the new Egyptian president to demonstrate his seriousness about continuing political reform.

 

The new U.S. president should realize that there is no reason why pressure on Egypt to undertake political reform should damage cooperation between the two countries at the regional level. For example, at the height of the Bush administration’s pressure on Egypt for political reform in 2004-5, Egypt sent an ambassador to Baghdad, the first Arab country to do so after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime. In any case, Egypt’s regional role has declined due primarily to internal political deadlock; a reinvigoration of political life in Egypt might allow it to reclaim its regional role in dealing with issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and reconciliation efforts in Lebanon.

 

As part of a new, more pragmatic approach, the new U.S. administration should finally abandon the fear that democratic reform in Egypt will result in the Muslim Brotherhood coming to power. Constitutional amendments passed in 2007 will prevent this. The Muslim Brotherhood cannot nominate any of its leaders to run for the presidency because it does not have a political party, and a Brotherhood candidate could not obtain enough votes in elected bodies to qualify to run as an independent candidate per stipulations in the Egyptian constitution.

 

Finally, the new U.S. administration should devote special attention to promoting the participation of youth in political parties and civil society. Ever since the United States began its support of democratic reform in Egypt, it has ignored a dangerous demographic reality: according to official statistics, young people make up 40 percent of Egypt’s inhabitants at a time when the country suffers from a severe lack of political participation.

Let’s hope that the opposition candidates, given their resources, will manage to run more effective campaigns with stricter messages, well-defined political platforms, and perhaps more of an emphasis on their vision of the country than their hatred of the current leader.  Have a look at Amr Hamzawy’s report on Egypt’s opposition from 2005.  We shouldn’t expect any surprises in the next election, but any step taken toward the creation of a serious political culture is a positive one.

A new report issued by Human Rights Watch calls on Egypt to inhibit the movement of African migrants toward theEgyptian-Israeli border, and calls into question the Egyptian government’s “shoot to kill” policy which has seen 33 people killed since July of 2007.  The report also questions the Israeli policy of returning these migrants to Egypt, where they face the harsh reality of racism, unemployment and poverty:

Israel has long told Cairo to do more to inhibit the movement of people across their border. But the rights organization was also critical of the Jewish state, saying that it should not immediately return to Egypt potential asylum-seekers where they could face deportation to nations with well-documented human rights violations.

“Despite the violations of refugee rights on the Egyptian side, Israel had returned many people back into the custody of the Egyptian border police,” Van Esveld said.

Some activists in Israel have started questioning their government’s policy of return, suggesting that as Jews themselves they should consider giving those who are seeking a reprieve from genocide the opportunity to remain.

“Both Egypt and Israel have responded to this cross-border flow with policies that violate fundamental rights,” said the report.

This problem has been well documented, and it’s good to see a detailed report out on the issue.  It won’t be solved, however, until the policies of both Israel and Egypt toward African migrants are adjusted.  Egyptian soldiers are given orders to shoot fleeing migrants in an effort to stem the flow of people crossing the Israeli border, while Israel returns the majority of migrants to Egypt where they must deal with the reality they’ve tried to escape from.

While I lived in Egypt, I remember passing by a square in Mohandeseen regularly, a wealthy suburb of Cairo, where a large group of African refugees were staging a protest near the office of the UNHCR.  It was more of a sit-in protest (depticted in the image above), and their presence was visible for months, but was hardly felt.  A group of well-intentioned Egyptians had offered them supplies (from baby formula to blankets and food) to blunt their social poverty, only to have their overture rejected. Their message was clear; they wanted to leave Egypt, to experience a life with more promise in a country that offered such a reality.  On December 30th, 27 of those refugees were killed when Egyptian security forces removed them from the square, transferring them to holding stations only to be realeased into a society that promised them no comfort.  It was clear then, and it should be clear now, that the policies governing the lives of African migrants living in Egypt need to change.