Dec
12
Sadegh Zibakalam, a professor at Tehran University, penned an op-ed that appeared in Lebanon’s Daily Star in which he questions the difference that a Democratic or Republican U.S president makes on the issue of engaging Iran, also noting that different Iranian presidents have been unable to sway Iranian foreign policy in a more moderate direction with regard to U.S-Iranian relations. The crux of the article is hard to argue, and gives view to the difficulty that Obama will have in making good on his campaign rhetoric of engaging Iran:
Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iranian leaders have watched five presidents of the United States come and go, including Jimmy Carter, who was president during the revolution. Two were Democrats and three were Republicans. Does the presence of a Democrat or a Republican president make any difference to relations between the US and Iran? Judging by these five presidents and three decades of hostility between Tehran and Washington, changes in the White House have made no difference.
The same observation is true of changes in government in Tehran. Hostility toward Washington remained unabated under the pragmatists led by Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the reformists led by Mohammad Khatami and the hard-liners led by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, even though the three governments pursued different policies on many issues.
There was, however, one exception. Khatami pursued a more moderate foreign policy that even included softening Tehran’s hitherto belligerent tone toward the US. The move was not reciprocated by US President Bill Clinton. This was a blow to the reformists in Tehran. The opportunity was ultimately destroyed when the hard-liners seriously opposed the olive branch Khatami extended to the Americans.
History aside, there are serious obstacles to any rapprochement between the two countries. Although at an early stage in his campaign Obama expressed his desire for “direct and unconditional talks” with Ahmadinejad, he was forced to deny this statement and replace it with a declaration of willingness to negotiate directly with Iranian leaders, not necessarily Ahmadinejad. The reason behind Obama’s denial was not difficult to understand. It went back to the root of the dilemma. Ahmadinejad is hugely unpopular in the US. His Holocaust denial, calls for the destruction of Israel, speeches at the United Nations General Assembly, and remarks in interviews and speeches in the US have all made him a remarkably unliked figure among many Americans.
In fairness to Obama, he’s backed off of the more unwitting statements he made during his presidential run when he seemed to suggest that he’d be willing to sit down with Ahmadinijad one-on-one, or at a greater summit. Not that sitting down with other human beings should be avoided; his rhetoric on having the moral courage to talk to those you disagree with was a refreshing divergence from the near-dogmatic morality of the previously established U.S attitudes toward Iran.
Rather, what would sitting down with Ahmadinijad accomplish? Zibakalam rightfully points to the upcoming presidential elections in the Islamic Republic as a sign that a more pragmatic, open president may be elected who could greet Obama’s overtures with more warmth. It would also ease domestic public opinion if Obama engaged an Iranian President that did not make the same vile statements which Ahmadinijad has made in the past. The problem with Zibakalam’s assessment of the situation is that an assumption is made that the Iranian presidency has significant control over the governing attitudes on foreign policy; these anti-U.S, anti-secular attitudes are well enshrined in the country’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. It would seem to me that former President Khatami, an Iranian reformer, failed to impose any significant changes because of the higher authority present in the country. Any policy short of engaging the Iranian regime at its highest, most influential levels would be unlikely to accomplish much. At best, an Obama administration may be able to forge cooperation on issues that are specifically of mutual interest (Iraq, a deal on the nuclear issue if the price is right). Any sea-changes in Iranian attitudes toward the U.S should not be expected until a new Supreme Leader is appointed by the nation’s highest clerical body. Here’s a summary of a study conducted by Carnegie’s Karim Sadjadpour, who argues that an understanding of the role that Khamenei plays in Iranian affairs is vital to any rapprochement (you can download the study at the link):
Sadjadpour argues that “Iran’s Islamic government is more powerful than it has ever been vis-à-vis the United States, Khamenei is more powerful than he’s ever been within Iran, and in order to devise a more effective U.S. policy toward Iran a better understanding of Khamenei is essential.” Though Khamenei is sometimes dismissed as weak and indecisive, Sadjadpour writes, “his rhetoric depicts a resolute leader with a remarkably consistent and coherent—though highly cynical and conspiratorial—world view.”
Given that the real political power of the Iranian Supreme Leader dwarfs that of the president, Sadjadpour argues, “It’s time for the world to focus less on Ahmadinejad and more on Khamenei. His speeches present arguably the most accurate reflection of Iranian domestic and foreign policy aims and actions over the last two decades.” He explores how Khamenei’s unexpected ascent to power is instructive in understanding his style of leadership, and unearths insightful quotes that provide deep insight into Khamenei’s thoughts on issues such as the United States, Israel, Iraq, President Ahmadinejad, and the nuclear issue.
“Given Iran’s centrality to urgent U.S. and European foreign policy challenges—namely Iraq, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, energy security, Arab–Israeli peace, and Afghanistan,” Sadjadpour writes, “the United States does not have the luxury of shunning dialogue with Tehran until Khamenei’s death or the arrival of a more accessible Iranian leader. This could be a long time in coming.”
Sadjadpour argues that any successful approach toward Iran must take into account Khamenei’s pivotal role in Iran’s decision-making process and his deeply held suspicions of the United States. “Trying to engage an Iran with Khamenei at the helm will no doubt be trying, require a great deal of nuance and patience, and offer no guaranteed chance of success. But an approach toward Iran that aims to ignore, bypass, or undermine Khamenei is guaranteed to fail.”
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