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Mahmoud Abbas issued what some have been calling the ‘threat’ of elections in the coming year should Palestine’s two major political factions, Hamas and Fatah, fail to reconcile anytime soon:

“We are determined that there be a continuation of the dialogue and will make every effort for it to succeed but if not, there will be a presidential decree at the onset of next year for simultaneous presidential and legislative elections,” Mr Abbas, pictured below, told a meeting of Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) committee members.

He did not set a date for a possible poll but said that any decree would call for elections to be held according to a system of “total proportional representation”, which would do away with the district contests that contributed to Hamas’s shock victory in the 2006 legislative elections. Hamas rejected Mr Abbas’s proposal, a stance which in effect makes it impossible for balloting to be held in Gaza.

Hani al-Masri, the director of the Alternatives think-tank in Ramallah, said that a new poll could make the Fatah-Hamas rivalry more bitter.

“If elections are held without Hamas’s agreement, we could end up with Fatah holding its own elections in the West Bank and Hamas holding its own elections in Gaza. Then the Palestinian division will reach the point of no return.” The ensuing legitimacy crisis could deteriorate to the point of “assassinations and bombings”, he said.

There are also doubts about whether Israel, which controls movement in the West Bank, would agree to polling.

That last point is significant as well, considering a recent report issued by the Isreali defense establishment to the country’s cabinet advising the prevention of “elections in the PA, even at the cost of a confrontation with the US and the international community”.

Just how wise would it be to hold elections in the Palestinian territories?  The two factions hold effective strongholds in their respective territories, and any new poll would likely strengthen the divide between Gaza and the West Bank.  Abbas is claiming he’d call for elections if no reconciliation is reached; with the governing institutions divided between the two territories, reconciliation seemed to many to be a prerequisite for elections.  Add to that Abbas’ inability to stimulate a grass-roots movement among the youth of the West Bank and the subsequent lack of new leaders to reinvigorate Palestinian politics, and a new election process may not necessarily favor Fatah.

I imagine the incoming U.S administration has learned from its experience with the previous Palestinian elections, and likely seek to temper talks of voting and stress the process of reconciliation before new leadership is selected.  The unfortunate reality remains that the ‘threat’ of elections seems empty given the consequences such a procedure would entail and the interests of third parties involved in the conflict.

In related Palestine/Israel news, the Saudi-sponsored 2002 Arab Peace Initiative is being pushed by British Foreign Secretary David Miliband, and by Abbas who took a more direct route of communicating with Israelis through a full page ad published in Israeli papers.  Hamas has denounced the move, calling Abbas a “merchant” for selling Palestinians’ rights.

Remember that U.S air strike in Syria toward the end of October that targeted Abu Ghadiyah, the man who conducted the traffic of arms and Qaeda fighters into Iraq?

Remember the ensuing outrage that we were treated to every morning in our newspapers?

Well, turns out the Syrians may have been wise to the entire affair, and may have even provided support for the operation.  According to Richard Sale of the METimes:

In spite of much angry public protest in Damascus, last month’s killing of top al-Qaida operative Abu Ghadiya, was in fact a joint operation between U.S. Special Forces in Iraq and Syrian intelligence, according to former and serving U.S. intelligence officials.Abu Ghadiya, a smuggler who for years had moved money, weapons and insurgents into Iraq from Syria, was killed by a U.S. helicopter raid on Oct. 26. Seven civilians were killed with him, and the resulting furor was immediate: Russia and the Arab League strongly protested the raid, and Syria accused the United States of “criminal and terrorist aggression” and lodged an official protest, according to U.S. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack. Syria ordered the American School in Damascus closed.

But Syria’s alleged anger was calculated to conceal Syrian complicity in the operation. Although the attack is still officially “classified,” serving and former U.S. intelligence officials told the Middle East Times that Syria gave U.S. forces permission to fly into its airspace and even provided extensive targeting intelligence on Abu Ghadiya. “Syrian intelligence couldn’t have been more cooperative,” said a former senior CIA official.

McCormack recently referred to this new cooperation in veiled language that acknowledged Syria had taken “positive steps” to play a more constructive role in the region even though “there’s still a ways to go.” He did not expand his point.

There’s been speculation of this for a few weeks, but this is the most conclusive article I’ve read on the matter yet.  Check out this article from the Guardian at the beginning of this month.  Sources also suggest then that Syria had expected the airstrike and that its airforce had authorized the passage of U.S hellicopters into Syrian territory.  Perhaps more interesting, the article mentions how an incursive kidnapping operation expected to be bloodless managed to go wrong:

In the time-honoured tradition of covert US operations in the Middle East, this one seems to have gone spectacularly wrong. The Syrians, who had agreed to turn a blind eye to a supposedly quiet “snatch and grab” raid, could not keep the lid on a firefight in which so many people had died.

The operation should have been fast and bloodless. According to the sources, Syrian intelligence tipped off the Americans about Abu Ghadiya’s whereabouts. US electronic intelligence then tracked his exact location, possibly by tracing his satellite telephone, and the helicopters were directed to him. They were supposed to kidnap him and take him to Iraq for questioning.

According to defence sources, when the four US helicopters approached the Syrian border, they were detected by Syrian radar. Air force headquarters in Damascus was asked for permission to intercept.

After an Israeli airstrike against a suspected nuclear reactor in the same region last year, Syrian air defence has been on high alert. The request was turned down by senior officers because the American operation was expected.

It is not clear what went wrong, but it is believed that the helicopters were spotted by the militants on their final approach and a gun battle broke out. That is supported by an account from a local tribal leader, who said a rocket-propelled grenade had been launched from the compound at the helicopter. The firefight blew the cover on a supposedly covert operation.

Ninety minutes after the raid, according to a local tribal leader, agents of the feared Mukhabarat, the Syrian intelligence service, flooded into the village. “They threatened us that if anyone said anything about what happened in this area, their family members would die,” he said.

So the operation’s cover was blown, and the Syrians went into damage control (i.e. denial and victimhood).  Either way Syrian complicity in the operation, should we choose to assume that its true,  sheds new light onto U.S-Syrian relations (which are improving at the expense of the latter’s political reform) and provides another sign which the future U.S administration will seize upon to make a deal with the Assad regime.  While this is not the first example of intelligence sharing between the two countries (intelligence ties were cut off following the assasination of former Lebanese PM Rafik Hariri in 2005), it is a sign that the Syrian leadership wants to remain in control and would be willing to negotiate its alliances should the right offer come its way.  Whether or not extending an offer would be the right move is debatable, but this window of opportunity will likely get a few passers-by to stop and peak through over the next four years.

Saudi Arabia’s King Abdallah is set to lead a religious conference hosted by the U.N today, with the monarch providing the opening address to the event.  While much of the commentary on this story has centered on the dialectical tension between the Saudis and religious tolerance, when viewed within the framework of the Kingdom’s foreign policy initiatives of late it reflects a sustained effort to improve Saudi Arabia’s image internationally, meanwhile solidifying its role as a key player in Middle Eastern affairs.  The King’s visit to the Vatican, the religious summits hosted by the Kingdom which culminated in the Madrid declaration signed in July, and the increased chatter about opening the country’s first Catholic church all serve to obscure the Saudi reality of religious tolerance.

The transgressions on religious freedom in Saudi Arabia are well documented and form a list that would be too tedious to repeat in this space.  The Kingdom’s international role, however, has reached new levels of stature; it has been courted by Western leaders (most notably during a recent visit by British PM Gordon Brown) to play a significant role in the handling of the latest financial crisis (no pledges of Saudi support at the last G-20 summit, but the significance of the enhanced status in the crisis speaks for itself).  The Saudis have also stepped up their roles in regional conflict resolution, exercising clout in the conflicts of Lebanon and Israel-Palestine (Obama will apparently base his MidEast peace efforts on the ‘Abdallah plan’, a road map to peace drafted in 2002.  A careful look at the language of the plan reveals how likely it is to work, but will still serve the Saudi’s well by creating constructive image of the country). (Update: Obama does not support the plan, according to peace-envoy Dennis Ross.)

All of this is to say that Saudi Arabia will likely be called on by the next U.S administration for help in cobbling together some sort of MidEast peace initiative, in large part due to a conscious effort since 2001 to improve the Kingdom’s international image.  How successful will the Saudis be?  If successful peace-talk mediation is going to come from anywhere in the Gulf, it may well be a country with a better recent track-record of MidEast solutions and less conflicting interests.

According to a statement by Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmad Aboul Gheit, Hezballah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah has been invited to visit Egypt “if he wants or can.” This comes after last months speculation in Lebanese and Israeli media, and subsequent denial by sources in the Egyptian government of any such overtures being extended toward Nasrallah.

I imagine that increased engagement by Middle Eastern players with Hezballah is an inevitability, however how would the reception of high-level Hezballah officials be seen by Egypt’s Western allies?  And what role, besides the limited one it has already played in supporting Lebanon’s military and government, does Egypt envisage itself carrying out with regard to Hezballah?

On a visit to Damascus this week, the first trip made by a top British diplomat since 2001, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband managed to re-establish high level intelligence sharing between his government and the Syrians.  With this renewed measure of cooperation, the Europeans (following Sarkozy’s visit in September) look set to usher Syria back into the international arena and may force the incoming Obama administration to play its hand on Syria early in its tenure.  The diplomatic isolation is beginning to thaw, and Joshua Landis suggests that renewed intelligence sharing will eventually force the United States into the fold, at the very least communicating with the Syrians indirectly:

The announcement that Miliband has re-established high level intelligence sharing with Syria is also significant. Secretary Rice and Foreign Minister Mu`allim discussed restarting intelligence sharing in May 2007 at Sharm al-Sheikh, but Syria asked the US to return an ambassador to Damascus as a sign of Syria’s cooperation. The US refused this gesture, forcing the US military “to take matters in their own hands.” Ultimately, the politicians in Washington forced the Defense department to settle the border issue militarily - hence the raid last month that killed eight Syrians. (We still have no proof that the Americans killed or captured the “facilitator” Abu Ghadiyya, whom they claim they snagged n the raid. I find it a bit odd that they have not shown us a photo of the man as they did with Saddam or his sons. Why all the secrecy about a raid they claimed as a stunning success and a person they have told us so much about?)

At any rate, the Syrians clearly offered the British the same offer they made to the Americans well over a year ago. The difference is that the British have been smart enough to take the offer, sending their foreign minister to Damascus as a gesture of good will and cooperation. So the British will now supply the US with Syrian intelligence. This will be awkward for the Americans; they will be dependent on the British for intelligence. Of course, if the Americans like the bits of intelligence they get from the Syrians, they will have to ask for more and will have to ask the Syrians to act on the intelligence or to deliver certain fighters. In this way, one can only presume that the Americans will start to negotiate with the Syrians indirectly. Just as the Syrians talk to the Israelis through the Turks, the US will talk to the Syrians through the British. The silliness of this will strengthen the Defense Department’s hand in insisting that Washington politicians do the right thing and grow up. It is just plain silly. Syria wants to help the US kill al-Qaida types, but the US refuses to say yes. How goofey is that? If Obama doesn’t send someone of stature to Damascus to fix this, I will eat my hat.

What do these diplomatic overtures signal for Lebanon, a country whose political instability over the past decade can largely be attributed to Syrian interference into Lebanese affairs?  Whenever French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner visits the Levant, he ties the importance of Syrian-Lebanese relations to Syria’s relations with the West.  Miliband is in Lebanon now, and after a meeting with the leader of the Future Movement Saad Hariri had this to say about Lebanese stability:

Miliband said that Lebanon’s stability was an indicator of that in the region.  “We appreciate the important steps that were taken and that are still underway to realize stability and strengthen the state in Lebanon,” he told reporters.  It was crucial, he added, that the international community send a strong message prior to the 2009 parliamentary elections. Miliband noted that his country supported Lebanon by coordinating with the United Nations and giving financing to the International Tribunal and investigation into the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri

The British minister said that the work toward the establishment of Lebanese-Syrian diplomatic ties was important and that he hoped it would be accomplished by the end of 2009. He also said that good neighbors must work together and maintain mutual respect.

His approach over the past three months, Miliband said, toward the peace process in the Middle East included addressing the issue of the Shebaa Farms, on which he said the incoming US administration was also determined to reach a settlement.

Miliband also promised to raise the issue of Syrian support for Hezballah during his trip to Damascus, but the British Foreign Secretary would be wise to remember Damascus’ other transgressions against Lebanese soveriegnty.  As an editorial in NOW Lebanon points out, both the Hariri assisination as well as decades of political interference paint skepticism on the faces of many Lebanese who worry that Syria’s latest maneuver toward the West may come at the expense of its political independence:

So sounds the message of a recent article in the Arab Reform Bulletin by Mohammed Abdel Baky, who impels the next U.S administration to sieze a moment for change in the process of Middle Eastern political reform.  While the 2005 elections proved a watershed moment for the country (the first election, rather than referendum, of Egypt’s presidency), most analysts looked ahead to 2011as a defining moment in Egypt’s modern political history.  Hosni Mubarak will almost certainly give up his post and, at least on paper, his successor will be chosen through a popular vote.  While the candidacies will be limited (given the constitutional reforms, indepedent candidates are pratically bareed from running), the direction which Egypt takes politically as well as the nature of the role it plays in Middle Eastern affairs will be dependant on its next leader.

Abdel Baky gives some insight into how the U.S can provide a constructive influence in the next election, building on its experience with the last one:

First, the United States in the near future must be pragmatic in dealing with certain realities that cannot be changed at present, notably candidates for the presidential election that will be held in September 2011. Washington should not attempt to advance one candidate over another or involve itself in any of the scenarios mentioned above. This is the exclusive concern of the Egyptian voter.

 

What the United States should do is to deal with the issue of the future of the Egyptian presidency in two phases: before and after the presidential election. Before the election, the United States should stress the importance of having the next Egyptian president chosen in transparent elections—despite the extremely limited choice of candidates—that the judiciary and civil society are permitted to oversee. After the election, Washington must support Egyptian demands to limit presidential terms to two, which will increase prospects for the peaceful alternation of power and alternative political forces to compete in future elections. Without presidential term limits, democratic reform in Egypt will be exceptionally difficult. Agreeing to such limits would be an important way for the new Egyptian president to demonstrate his seriousness about continuing political reform.

 

The new U.S. president should realize that there is no reason why pressure on Egypt to undertake political reform should damage cooperation between the two countries at the regional level. For example, at the height of the Bush administration’s pressure on Egypt for political reform in 2004-5, Egypt sent an ambassador to Baghdad, the first Arab country to do so after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime. In any case, Egypt’s regional role has declined due primarily to internal political deadlock; a reinvigoration of political life in Egypt might allow it to reclaim its regional role in dealing with issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and reconciliation efforts in Lebanon.

 

As part of a new, more pragmatic approach, the new U.S. administration should finally abandon the fear that democratic reform in Egypt will result in the Muslim Brotherhood coming to power. Constitutional amendments passed in 2007 will prevent this. The Muslim Brotherhood cannot nominate any of its leaders to run for the presidency because it does not have a political party, and a Brotherhood candidate could not obtain enough votes in elected bodies to qualify to run as an independent candidate per stipulations in the Egyptian constitution.

 

Finally, the new U.S. administration should devote special attention to promoting the participation of youth in political parties and civil society. Ever since the United States began its support of democratic reform in Egypt, it has ignored a dangerous demographic reality: according to official statistics, young people make up 40 percent of Egypt’s inhabitants at a time when the country suffers from a severe lack of political participation.

Let’s hope that the opposition candidates, given their resources, will manage to run more effective campaigns with stricter messages, well-defined political platforms, and perhaps more of an emphasis on their vision of the country than their hatred of the current leader.  Have a look at Amr Hamzawy’s report on Egypt’s opposition from 2005.  We shouldn’t expect any surprises in the next election, but any step taken toward the creation of a serious political culture is a positive one.

A new report issued by Human Rights Watch calls on Egypt to inhibit the movement of African migrants toward theEgyptian-Israeli border, and calls into question the Egyptian government’s “shoot to kill” policy which has seen 33 people killed since July of 2007.  The report also questions the Israeli policy of returning these migrants to Egypt, where they face the harsh reality of racism, unemployment and poverty:

Israel has long told Cairo to do more to inhibit the movement of people across their border. But the rights organization was also critical of the Jewish state, saying that it should not immediately return to Egypt potential asylum-seekers where they could face deportation to nations with well-documented human rights violations.

“Despite the violations of refugee rights on the Egyptian side, Israel had returned many people back into the custody of the Egyptian border police,” Van Esveld said.

Some activists in Israel have started questioning their government’s policy of return, suggesting that as Jews themselves they should consider giving those who are seeking a reprieve from genocide the opportunity to remain.

“Both Egypt and Israel have responded to this cross-border flow with policies that violate fundamental rights,” said the report.

This problem has been well documented, and it’s good to see a detailed report out on the issue.  It won’t be solved, however, until the policies of both Israel and Egypt toward African migrants are adjusted.  Egyptian soldiers are given orders to shoot fleeing migrants in an effort to stem the flow of people crossing the Israeli border, while Israel returns the majority of migrants to Egypt where they must deal with the reality they’ve tried to escape from.

While I lived in Egypt, I remember passing by a square in Mohandeseen regularly, a wealthy suburb of Cairo, where a large group of African refugees were staging a protest near the office of the UNHCR.  It was more of a sit-in protest (depticted in the image above), and their presence was visible for months, but was hardly felt.  A group of well-intentioned Egyptians had offered them supplies (from baby formula to blankets and food) to blunt their social poverty, only to have their overture rejected. Their message was clear; they wanted to leave Egypt, to experience a life with more promise in a country that offered such a reality.  On December 30th, 27 of those refugees were killed when Egyptian security forces removed them from the square, transferring them to holding stations only to be realeased into a society that promised them no comfort.  It was clear then, and it should be clear now, that the policies governing the lives of African migrants living in Egypt need to change.

News reports are buzzing with speculation that Hillary Clinton has been offered the role of Secretary of State in the upcoming Obama administration, a happening I believe few people had expected. If the speculation turns out to be true, however, Clinton may find ample incentive to take the position, given its historical role as a stepping stone to the presidency. Beside the advantage of a padded-resume, the position would allow her to exercise a large measure of influence on U.S foreign policy and perhaps even leave an indelible mark (for better or worse) on its role in global affairs.

Given the narrow margin of her loss to President-elect Obama during the Democratic primaries and the support she still holds among the public and her party’s top brass, her involvement in an Obama administration seemed to be there for the taking if she so desired. Clinton is currently considered the front-runner for the position on a short-list that includes the familiar faces of Senator John Kerry and Former U.N ambassador Bill Richardson. How would the appointment of Hillary Clinton to the Secretary of State affect U.S policy on the Middle East?

Beside running the State Department, the Secretary of State traditionally serves the President as his chief foreign policy advisor. The nature of this role has had exceptions; during the Cold War, depending on the administration, the top foreign policy advisor was sometimes the Secretary of State or the National Security Advisor. In recent times it could be argued that the Vice President’s office has played an enlarged role in the formation of foreign policy. The Secretary of State plays a few other roles in foreign affairs, including the handling of negotiations with foreign governments and their representatives, and the marketing of U.S foreign policy to the rest of the world. Given the presence of Vice President Joe Biden (not my favorite policy architecht, but knowledgable nonetheless), and the possible involvement of Samantha Power in the next administration (an academic and a prominent writer, she’s been widely tapped for the position of National Security Advisor), Clinton’s influence on Obama in matters of foreign affairs may be limited. Further influence on Obama may be hampered by their reportedly contentious relationship stemming from the Democratic primaries. Hillary Clinton’s selling ability however, given her public stature, could be well suited to the position.

Of what we can derive from her presidential run, Clinton’s foreign policy views are nearly identical to those of Obama. Beside the standard campaign rhetoric on Iraq (both want to see a withdrawal of U.S presence, but both are cautious of how this would proceed) and Afghanistan (the first of the individual Wars on Terror is likely to receive a renewed focus in the coming four years), we have little to glean from either of their foreign policy objectives other than an increased emphasis on multilateralism and probably a more realist approach to exercising American power abroad. Compare their Foreign Affairs articles, for instance, written toward the end of 2007. While they generally reek of the traditional ambiguity of a political stump speech, their essays reflect the democratic line on foreign policy, perhaps only separated by their distinct emphasis’ on themes of experience and judgment that served to anchor their campaign messages. The possible points of contention emerge on discussions of approaching Iran, with Clinton seeming rhetorically less-open to high level negotiations with the Islamic Republic that have been proposed by Obama. While their policy differences on Iran are minute, Clinton’s emphasis during the primaries on setting ‘pre-conditions’ before engaging the Iranians (which is already happening) managed to pull Obama’s conciliatory language toward the center on the issue, dropping suggestions that he would meet with Ahmadinejad (a rather pointless endeavor to propose in the first place, given where real power on Iran’s foreign policy is centered).
Clinton does carry some light baggage with respect to Iran. During an interview with ABC news toward the end of her presidential run, she responded to a question about the possibility of Iran attacking Israel with nuclear weapons with this statement:

“I want the Iranians to know that if I’m the president, we will attack Iran. In the next 10 years, during which they might foolishly consider launching an at

tack on Israel, we would be able to totally obliterate them.”

Iran protested formally to the U.N, and Iranian members of parliament responded to the provocation with typical indignation and resentment. While protests to the comment are more symbolic than anything else (similar comments have been made by others throughout the past 8 years), reputation is an integral factor in diplomacy and negotiation, and her efforts to engage Iran may receive a sour reception from an already reluctant political establishment in that country.

Any appointee to the position will be responsible for executing an ambitious agenda challenged by a weakened base of resources and power. The familiar obstacles of Israel-Palestine, MidEast political reform, Iraq, Iran, and Syria-Lebanon require a determined yet pragmatic approach to overcome. With all the talk of Senators and former presidential candidates being considered for the job, one cannot help but wish that more established, wonky foreign affairs experts would be short listed to head the U.S state department. A ceremonial appointee (which Clinton and Kerry would largely be) could serve to draw increased attention to their efforts, but wouldn’t it be more appropriate to appoint a person specialized in foreign affairs or diplomacy to head America’s foreign policy bureaucracy? I’m skeptical of the short-list, but almost any appointee will carry out a similar agenda with regard to the Middle East.

One of the most compelling contrasts offered to us throughout this past election cycle has been the manner in which an exuberant optimism has been met with cautious skepticism. In a debate held in Maastricht’s ravishing Selexyz bookshop on the night of the election, Danny Merideth, a political advisor to the U.S ambassador to the Netherlands, suggested the tempering of expectations held of an Obama administration. Similarly, other members of the debate panel were quick to point to the difficulties that an Obama administration would face in pursuing its ambitious agenda. The restrictions Barack Obama will face are certainly true of any incoming president; a newly-elected chief executive must deal with their predecessors’ budget, is likely to honor the military and trade agreements already established, and must deal with the challenges posed by the international system, in this case two wars and a commitment to fighting terrorism. Add to that the mounting financial crisis, and it may be easy to understand why reality could weaken the winds powering the sails of an incoming administration that has charted a path paved with hope and headed toward significant change.

It would be prudent of us, however, to step back and cautiously monitor the doubts we express of next four years, in lieu of the history that was made on November the 4th; a history that is likely to litter the pages of history books written for generations to come. Watching the reaction to Barack Obama’s victory that night, both here in Maastricht and around the globe, I was reminded of another culturally significant movement that reshaped the image of the United States both within and outside the nation. In 1969, a concert featuring the days’ most prominent rock and roll artists took place in a small suburb of New York. Woodstock, as the event would come to be known, was as significant for the unification of a generation as the peace and love which it exuded. In the only documentary produced on the event, its director Michael Wadleigh managed to capture images of a youth compelled to unity, inspired by potential and motivated by the questionable actions of its government. One can only imagine the narrative with which history will portray Obama’s victory, as well as the screaming crowds that followed his march to the White House and celebrated his arrival.

The projection of unity in this election, spanning a globe that has grown weary of the exploits of the world’s unipolar, may have far superseded that of the Woodstock generation. This unity is likely to stand distinct in its historicity, and may well prove to be a potent currency with which an Obama administration will act to meet the global challenges of the next four years. What follows are four reasons why this election is probable to affect significant change on the world’s future, and why in addition to tempering our expectations and hopes, we may want to constrain our skepticism.

The Significance of Ethnicity/Race

The shade of Barack Obama’s skin, while tempting to write-off as insignificant to the way he will run the United States in his upcoming term, is significant, and not only because of the racial progress it is symbolic of. While writings in the vein of Christopher Hitchens’ and William Kristol’s have emerged throughout the election cycle suggesting the lack of importance a candidate’s black skin will have toward his administration’s policies and programs, I’d like to suggest otherwise. It was not Obama’s proposals on pursuing militants in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, nor his suggestion that an increased effort was required of the U.S’ allies in Europe to stabilize Afghanistan that prompted the support of millions from Gaza to Nairobi.

And while his international support cannot be solely explained away as stemming from his racial and ethnic identity, it has certainly proved a forceful magnet in attracting positive views of the United States. At a time when the favorability of the U.S, according to several Pew poll results, rarely exceeds the mark of 50% among developing nations, the election of an African American has reframed the narrative of the American dream. Obama’s election has strengthened the image of U.S democracy around the world, and has conjured up the imaginations of those people who live with an unfortunate reality of the lack of opportunity for success of this magnitude in their own countries. This has manifested itself into statements by heads of state praising the triumph of ethnic and racial tolerance; Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai suggested Obama’s election ushered in a “new era” in which politics would transcend race, color and ethnicity.

Although this mode of thinking may demonstrate the failure “to emancipate (ourselves) from the original categories of identity that acted as a fetter upon clear thought,” as Hitchens has noted, it is equally representative of the emotive response much of the world still holds toward racial and ethnic identity, and the important role it has and will play in changing the perceptions of the United States for the better.

The World Was Watching, and Obama Spoke To Them

Every election in modern history has been watched by the world, with differing degrees of interest. With the advent satellite television networks, the internet, and other tools of global communication, billions of people have been able to garner a nuanced appreciation of the U.S election process. While this writer may be too young to appreciate the attention paid to elections past, it should be safe to say that the support Obama has received overseas has been both impressive and unprecedented.

For almost two full years, the international community has been privy to an election held on the grandest and arguably most important stage of them all. Foreign newspapers, television newscasts, and websites were filled with coverage and opinion on the election from the moment Obama announced his run to his last speech declaring his victory. People outside the U.S expressed their views, hopes, and criticisms of the candidates; what’s significant is that a candidate spoke back to them.

Several of Obama’s speeches were sprinkled with messages to the world. After losing three of the first four primaries to Senator Hillary Clinton, Obama alluded to both the tone of his opponent’s campaign and the international attention surrounding it when he said “The world is paying attention to how we conduct ourselves. What will we they see? What will we tell them? What will we show them?” Similarly, on the night of his victory in the general election, in a speech given to over 125,000 people in attendance, Obama addressed his audience overseas:

“And to all those watching tonight from beyond our shores… our stories are singular, but our destiny is shared, and a new dawn of American leadership is at hand. To those who would tear this world down — we will defeat you. To those who seek peace and security — we support you.”

An International America?

Not to exaggerate the influence he will have or the transformative effect he’ll wield on the way U.S power is used, but the possibility for a more international America is at hand. That is not to suggest that the preeminence of American national security will fade, or that strategic interests will suddenly cease to be the primary motivator for U.S action around the globe. For all the talk of the Bush military doctrine and the wisdom of nation-building, much of what we’re likely to see in the next four years will be a continuation of the past eight. To his credit, Obama’s campaign for the presidency has managed to ooze exceptionalism without making his foreign spectators queasy.

However, amidst all that will stay the same, Obama is very likely to leave an indelible mark on American foreign policy. Of all the candidacies we’ve been exposed to throughout this election, his has been by far the most forward-thinking. Of particular interest to this writer is his counter-terrorism plan, audaciously named his “Plan to Defeat Terrorism”. And while that won’t happen, Obama’s plan stands out for the manner in which it details the role that communication will play in this endeavor. In an effort to shore up support for extremists, the plan mentions the importance of speaking directly to Muslim audiences, and training diplomats in media skills and foreign languages in order to provide an American presence on foreign satellite networks. As part of a large scale public diplomacy effort, Obama’s plan aims to build new “America Houses” that would serve as cultural centers in regions of the world where anti-Americanism is so fervent it may play a role in driving people toward extremist groups. The plan also makes mention of providing alternative options for education in countries where Islamic schooling, prone to the absorption of extremist thought, tends to dominate. Finally, he plans to double spending on U.S foreign aid by the end of his first term, setting a goal of $50 billion dollars.

Obama is Symbolic of a New Generation

‘The torch has been passed’ may have earned its official status as a cliché following election night, however it speaks to a large measure of truth. Barack Obama is very much a child of a ‘flattened globe’, to borrow a phrase from Thomas Friedman. Born to a mother from Kansas and a father from Kenya, having lived in Indonesia for four years as a child, and mingling almost exclusively with foreign students throughout his undergraduate years, Obama’s upbringing is one that forms a holistic, inclusive perspective on the world. Refreshing as that sounds, that perspective will serve not only as a pallet-cleanser to the last eight years; it has and will continue to draw more international attention to what he says and does.

It is conceivable that an international lobby may prove more capable of exerting some measure of influence on the presidency in the coming 4 years than it has been able to in the past eight. If that is the case, it will in large part be due to Obama’s time spent overseas. Why this is not a perennial requirement for the self-proclaimed leaders of the free world is beyond my understanding. I must say, however, I will be looking forward to an American president who can both relate and speak effectively to his generation and the generation to follow, as evidenced by a campaign that seemed to possess more awareness of the world around it than that of his opponent.

While the prospects for an Obama presidency may arguably be overrated, the next four years are likely to effect significant change on American leadership for reasons other than the departure of President Bush. We are likely to see America’s image reframed to appeal to the world, with a leader at its helm more willing to consider our appeals toward him. And although the chants of “yes we can”, the multi-colored Obama t-shirts adulating the man, and the prospects for disappointment may give cause to those cautioning the lowering of expectations, we should temper our skepticism to appreciate the change that has already come, and the promise it holds for our futures.

(to be updated soon)